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ABSTRACT
INTERVENTION INTO A TURBULENT
.URBAN SITUATION: A CASE STUDY
6. Masai Cadvell, Jr.
Dr.,. Milton Silver, Supervising Professor
•• The National Aeronautics and Space Administration sponsored a
raiaaarch effort directed toward an tap roved understanding of -large- ;
, scale systems technology and aanagetnent. Major objectives were:
(1> the deiBonati-afcion. of the applicability of tike HASA prganiza-
• • ' • . ' • ' • • • • ' . • ..v ; ' • '^.' : " ' ' • "
tion and maixageroant experience to the solution of large-scale public
. ; .' ^ ' ' ;* • ' • ' . : • - ' " • '• ' -- '•
problems; (2) the expansion of, the tftiiversity*a-'research competence;
"•' • '•
 :;
 '• '
 :
 ' '
;
 - '. :" m . I - , - • .•.( .• ' „•;"',. : » - ' • • . " * ' . • •
and (3) *he genaaralieatioTi ol the iBjowl«dgeg,aiaed in this demonstra-
•; , .-..-,• ~
 ( ,;. •' •;.' . .' ..- I* • •. .„,- _. '"-'t '; "... '.'• • , -.- ' • . ' ."•?' / . • • • ' - '
tioo project to other similar large-scale piroblass.
-Thie:fMJpe* reports: the application i:of' SAS^fattageaent 'Philos-
ophy atid.teoiini^ues within New Case3jft Cownty, beiawara, to meet
actual probleas of conanuaity violence, and resulted in restructuring
the county^ approach to problems of this nature, and developing a ,
' • ' " ' • > • - ' ' • ' • . . ••'• • t • ' . . • • • . - " ,
co»prehen»ive:systeiB of planning based on the NASA.Planning Process^
which invoLvad federal state, and local resources with community
representatives in solving the problems before them.
The;concept pf: a "turbulent environment" is presented with
parallelS'drawn between NASA Management experience and problems , ^  .
,oi ma»agBiHBB^ m4l^ U aix urban areaa:. ;• •. ... ,'; •;. O.-. '\ .' /•: '^-••^.•"' :.
XThe action-research methodology used in the study is
considered to.be most appropriate for turbulent environments.
., INTRODUCTION •
<•
NASA/DREXEL PROGJfcAM
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration, in
conjunction with Drexel University, has engaged In a research effort
directed toward an 'Improved understanding of large-scale systems
technology and management. This research program has had as its
major objectives: (1) the demonstration of the- applicability of the
NASA organization, and management experience to th& solution of
.-' . " Vjf •.. ' • ' " ' • • i*' . >.
 :. • -t -' '
r
 •
... " -. •-* '•! ' • -v • '• '-' :,.i' »•"' ••--I . . '•' '. • .- •'
laige^ecal^ p^ihilc a(taiol«tratiou fctoblem*; (2) fchs expansion of the
UniWrslty -«r ruaaarch eompatanca ij* this area „, a* veil , a*v st»engthen-
••V. '•• - '"\.-+ ' "' ' • ' • '• ... .^ ^"'s •' ' ' '?- " '' . • : " • ' .* .•':''••'''* " ..'' • ' . ' - ' •
ing the faculty «ad ourriculuai of tbe»Unlverait>; and (3) the C '
' ' ' ' ' ' ""
of the- knowledge gained in »;ioa8trat iom; project •
to other siaAlar lArge^ Hcale pxobleana of ,«oncerj% to 'the nation. .
Supported as NASA Grant NGL 39-004-020, this effort has
resulted io a-.multidiaciplinary approach within the University, and
the development, of a NASA/ Drexel Consulting Team which consulted for
eighteen months in New Castle County, Delaware, Co test research
results M aa actual large-scale social system.
•- •> . ." :4'p. •' • •• -:"' - : . . . . • . . /'
••• '"•• " • •':••' •• • •'•>'.••• • ' . • - " •" ' . .' ' .<•',
„.' This -(toBimMftH; I'ip a report of one clinical research .project
KROJSCT .OOTHSE, »- , _•. . '•- -• .-,.•'>.- - • -
 ; . • . - .
The pT*»i»e ot< tilis.llASA/Drexel Pragram. is that management of
..':"' ' '., ' -' '' • '
 !
'.'. '' .' •• ' Jv .' :' '" ' •'' ' ;' '
NASA aa4 »f aft urban compleK aye analogous la?ge -scale ^ffdrts^ and
that management technology developed for the former can be utilized
or adapted fox the latter.
This paper reports the application of NASA Management philosophy
and technology to solve urgent urban problems. The paper first
presents a background discussion of the Research Design and Method-
ology (Section I); then a literature search and an overview of
,NASA Management technology and philosophy (Section 13); and, finally
documents the application of selected concepts and techniques within
an urban setting to meett actual problems (Sections III and IV).
The specific projects assigned this research associate included
delivery of social -aervi«»es in &>. area local officials considered
their "Watts'! (with an equivalent possibility of disruption and
rioting), the stemming of a black-white shooting incident, and the
transformation of adverse relationships between county government
and citizeae lato positive problem-solving relationships.
RESEARCH PBOJBCT RESUWS
Conclusions drawn from this study.are considered from several
points of view:
0
 Action Research Process
0
 Philosophy of Management in a Turbulent Environment
0
 SASA JIanagement Technology
0
 Achievements in New Castle County
ACTION RESEARCH PROCESS
A clinical methodology, "Action Research," was adopted to guide
the operational implementation of selected technology to solve
•*.
specific problems in the' DeLaWarr and Belvedere areas of Mew Castle
County. Within the conduct of the program it was found that the
management philosophy which guided NASA ifc development of specific
management tools to meet NASA's problems had relevance to this
researcher's efforts. Thus, the scope of the program was expanded
to evaluate the utility of NASA's philosophy and approach to manage^ '.
meat as well as the application of specific management tools to
meet .. specific assigned problems. .-''••
; The Action Research. Methodology provided that action-
interventiOnS be planned and taken in response $o needs of the
client system; and that these needs would be identified during the
clinical pkasa of the NASi/Drexel Program. Thus, issues of problem
select ioa, .itfentificatipn of aspects of the environment which were
. . -. • ' . • - . : • • • ' / • .• '.*. '
of concern, pin-pointing tke relevant phefiomeaa, etc. , were not
detemteed , la advs^ttee.. Tbey wexe d«Eermin«d ia coRjunctioa with the
client in response to his parti culajr problems. ;IlBese issues are the
specif ic Isfwes o£ decisJLon making vitbin a TuTlmlent Environment.
PHILOSOPHY OF MANAGEMEST IN A TTOBUL^  ENVIIOMENT • "
'.'•'•'••'••• • .
 ;
 •
 !
*. • ••' ' - • • .
A "turbulent environment" is one in which the. dynamics arise
. '•. - . ' . . ' , ( • ' • ' ' : -. - ' •
from (1) interaction among organizations within the environment,
and (2) discontiauities with past .experience; that is, additional .
factors and the multiple character of causal interconnections
require fcfeat effort be invested in the determination of relevant
factors aad. their iapa«t on problems at hand prior to the application
£ . ' ' ' - • •: " ' ' ' ' . • ' ' ? ' . ' . - • ' • ^
of some toal- or technique which may have b««n ^f f ectivoR, in the past.
NASA Management Philosophy, as articulated in writings and
interviews with senior management personnel, was more relevant to the
specific action research performed by this researcher than were the
tools used by NASA in its own functioning. This was due to the
turbulent environment in which the NASA Administrator and senior
managers functioned, and the buffering function performed at these
levels to reduce environmental complexity for NASA component sub-
systems (and thus the management systems used within NASA). The
action research reported herein was also in a purbulent environment;
thus, the philosophy level was more useful than the tool level for
the planning of action interventions.
NASA MANAGEMENT TECHNOLOGY
The NASA Planning Process provided a model-for participative
planning of-the DeLaWarr Social Services Center. Due to the
turbulent environment, the relevant aspects of the problem had to
be defined before beginning to approach solutions. The planning
panel established in DeLaWarr brought together those closest to the
problem—representatives of the needs (the community) and resources
(government and private social service agencies)—in a long-term
cooperative problem-solving effort. The planning panel also
provided a base for attack on other problems, such as black identity
and competence, group to group relationships (both black-white and
citizen-bureaucrat), and provided a non-violent means for having
the governmental systeril respond to community needs.
Additionally, in response to a shooting crisis, a one-day work-
shop in Belvedere successfully telescoped the long-term DeLaWarr
process.
ACHIEVEMENTS IN NEW CASTLE COUNTY
Specific accomplishments from the point of view of the New
Castle County client included: .''..' . ,
1. Channeling of community violence into less destructive
' • . . . ' . ' '.' ' ' ' • '• . " • - .••'• ' • • " •'
 ;
 ;
forms.of behavior
2. Developing the:plan, obtaining necessary approvals and
funding, and commencing construction of a Health & Social
Service Facility in PeLaWarr ,
- 3. Institutionalizing problem-solving activities between
.government and-citizens through mechanisms of citizens
. '
 :
 advlapry boerda ' •. "-. •. . ;.•-;• .. •=• :•• •••"•.•
4.. Eatablishment Of an intardapartaaental planning group in
the county government to d«Al with probXeas which require
internal Coordination of dapfertaaentsatld liaison with
. . " - - ' • . " ;
outside organizations. .
FOOTNOTES
1. Memorandum of Understanding, Drexel University and the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration, dated August 11, 1969,
hereto appended as Appendix A.
Cfi
CHAPTER I
NASA/DREXEL PROGRAM
RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY
BACKGROUND .
The basic parameters for the NASA/Drexel Program in Technology
and Management of Large Scale Programs included "action-oriented"
studies with provision for the University to ". . . assist in the
transfer of technology and management methods from one large-scale
2program to another i . ." This emphasis on applied research was
especially appropriate for three reasons: first, NASA had
previously identified the need for experimental and demonstration
programs for the application of the results of space research and
• • 3 .'
development to urban problems. Secondly, Drexel University had a
rich tradition through cooperative education and consulting programs
emphasizing the applications of research. Thirdly, NASA had
previously identified student Cooperative Programs as being effective
4links between theory and practice.
Thus an action-oriented research design was selected with the
goal of having the research associate function as a participant
observer in some (to be selected) urban system. Known as "Action
Research," the methodology was proposed to NASA, and received
enthusiastically.
ACTION RESEARCH
"Action Research" was coined by the applied psychologist, Kurt
Lewin, and defined as:
. . . a field which developed to satisfy the needs of the
socio-political individual who recognizes that, in science,
he can find the most reliable guide to effective action,
and the needs of the scientist who wants his labors to be
of maximum social utility as well as of theoretical ',
significance.?
Figure 1 summarizes the Action Research Methodology as applied
within the current NASA/Drexel Program. Note that, the Action
Research Methodology stressed that research would be performed to
meet the needs of a specific urban client system. Additionally,
per Lewin's definition above, the researcher would aim his labors
as well to be of theoretical significance.
Action Research differs from other applied social research in
the extensive involvement of the researcher within the action *
process. Some social scientists, reviewing the historical applica-
tion of action research, have called this "... applied research
with a client with a problem to be solved" and have called- for
increased attention to the ethics of the situation, the social
scientist's (vis a vis the client's) interest in the research, and
the possibility of location of initiative too exclusively with the
9 ' ' • ' ' • ' '
client. .
Thus, the Action Research Methodology is unlike traditional
research methodologies in several ways. That Action Research is
performed in direct response to a perceived client problem is the
first. A second is the concept of Participant-Observer. The
FIGURE 1
ACTION RESEARCH METHODOLOGY*
The Action Research methodology will proceed in the following
manner:
1. Initial Entry
Efforts will be made to gain initial entry to a particular
urban system by June or September 1970. Sanction, and negotia-
tion of terms of the relationships, should be agreed upon before
final entry.
2. Orientation and Exploration
Once initial entry is agreed upon, a period of 2 to 3 months
should be utilized to study that particular client system in order
to more fully understand how it functions and disfunctions. Fur-
thermore, this initial explanation and orientation period should
serve as a period of gaining wider acceptance and identification
with that system. Finally, problem identification and definition
would be accomplished in this exploration period.
3. Action Planning and Intervention
Once problems'are identified and agreement is negotiated with
the client system, then each problem area will be studied as to
strategies, designs or methods to effect change or influence to a
preferred state. Alternative methods will be considered for each
problem. Every effort will be made to consider the behavioral and
organizational consequence of every intervention so as not to
upset the homedstasis of that system.
4. Action Evaluation -
Concurrent with the action research, evaluation of the par-
ticular projects will be made by the Associate Investigators, and
the organizational preceptors. When appropriate, some of the
preceptors may serve as adjunct professors. All of these will
serve.as process observers of the action research and provide con-
sultative assistance.
5. Termination and Description
Finally, .upon successful accomplishment of the action research,
a descriptive dissertation will be presented with hypothesis,
action steps, and consequences or results, with generalizations
drawn from the research. Successful action research should pro-
duce three basic.outcomes: (1) the achievement of the planned
change, (2) new knowledge, and (3) a manager of increasing pro-
fessional .competence.
8
*Suromarized from an early NASA/Drexel Program Working Paper. See
Appendix B for a detailed discussion.
MO..
specification of the researcher's participation is in contrast to
the usual thrust to identify and minimize the so-called "experi- •,
mentor effect."10»n : V . : :
A third major difference is in use of the Case Study. Classic
studies attempt to demonstrate statistically that study results
are, within specified probabilistic limits, not due to chance. A
single case study represents zero statistical degrees of freedom,
and allows valid statistical criticism. There are two responses:
the first response is to follow the lead of the Tayistock Clinic
and generalize not upon a single case,..but on a series of cases.
Called an "Ad Hoc Programme," Tavistock has been able to extract
•
 :
 • - ' • •• ••"" ' 12generalized data using action research techniques. , .
The second response is to utilize the case study "as a
' • ' ' 13 '
vehicle to enrich the development of new theory." .
*> ' • r* '
The application of NASA Technology to urban problems falls
within the development of new theory. The subtleties involved in
researching new theory in the public arena were highlighted dur-
ing a discussion of fhe current NASA/Drexel program at the 1969
Conference on Public Administration:
... it is interesting to consider why these large-
scale problems are both interesting and difficult. I
suspect that one of the reasons why academicians prefer
a certain amount of detachment is that they can con-
ceptualize and thereby handle an idealized problem much
better than a real one. It can be kept simple, the num-
ber of variables reduced, and frequently some of the
human factors eliminated altogether. In real large-
scale problems, however, the sheer qualitative features
are different from those of small ones.
... The human factors enter in a different way. The
behavior of very large groups and the constituent sub-
groups are interlocked in ways which are numerous, com-
plex, and subtle. The magnification factor :of any
11
subtlety may make it very Important in determining the
success of a given .project.1^
This pap*r is designed as a vehicle to enrich the complex
subtleties of new theory, and, hopefully, will provide a neces-
sary link in an effort continued beyond the present limitations of
time and budget.
IMPLICATIONS OF ACTION RESEARCH
The decision to use an action research methodology meant that
an action program could not be specified in advance. In contrast
to the situation most often found—that of searching out a situ-
ation (either laboratory or real world) in which one could test a
scientific hypothesis—it meant that the research associate had to
•
be prepared to ceep&nd to a problem of the client* and, further-
' " ' - . . '
more, to approach the client's problem in a way .which produced
results of eeiaattlfia significance. !
Inventory of RASA Management Technology and Philosophy
The goal of the program was to test selected applications of
NASA Manageaent Technology within an urban context. Action
research, precluded the a priori decision to apply certain tech-
niques. NASA Management,-Technology and the philosophy underlying
the technology were investigated by this research associate, to
provide a -sound basis for possible transfer. Chapter II sum-
marizes the relevant literature and identifies the management
technology which prior research efforts have articulated as
appropriate fox transfer from NASA to other endeavors. The'NASA
Planning Process, an additional technology identified in the
12
content of the present study, is described in Chapter III. Chapter
IV discusses NASA management philosophy. The philosophy of manage-
ment NASA developed to support operations in a complex and turbulent
world proved to have specific application in the urban setting, as
documented in Section III, Action Research, which describes actual
events in the applied testing of NASA concepts.
13
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Page 2.
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CHAPTER II
NASA MANAGEMENT TECHNOLOGY
PUBPOSE
This chapter summarizes the relevant literature and identifies !
management technology which prior research efforts have specified as
applicable to other endeavors. . ' • • . ' • ;
SUMMARY OF THE RELgVAHT LITERAXUBB ;
The political intact of the,orbital flight of Sputnik in 1957
 ; ,; ,
was 60 "shake the U.S. natioa to its very core and develop the . ' p v
urgency . . . to raarafcall and atjjanize -quicWky ,*he vast intellectualv" • ; -•
• - " ;•' ::- - ' '.. ; ' *" ' ' • • •" . ' ' •• "'•'• *:•'*.'<'J/' ••'
technological^, physical. an4 szufe^erial resoBMro** required of manite v r ; ^
' ' ' . : • . - . :- ' • • ;: ' • . ' ^v *.'£(:,,$•• - -
. • ' • : - • - •,;» . . - ; . ' . - . • • • : . . - ' - . - , ' : • , - < V ^ : ^
venture into unexplored ep^ ce.
 : ..  • -' •-•' . '••'• \ •...•; |, ^
Th«'te»p<»se is now wellHowwn.;.. Diepa«*Ke cesourceA were: :, ,^.,;: ^
• ;, ,•- r •: ;. .;• ; , .,.'• , - ,-, »• •• •'•,<t"t:-f.:;
•
;
, - • ••=•'• .. , -. ••• : • f. :. : ' • • . .-. '•".."• .; .•-..•;;^f
mobllizad and o«g«n4Bed; ma*aari«i aad sociai technologies wfere I <Vv.
' ' ' . ' A i " • . , > .
. . . . . ' • • • . , ? ' • ' • - ; ' . . • - - > : - '
invented and expanded; and managed effectually to achieve the well-<-.
. > " . . . ' ; . ' -'%• ' • ' • • = . • . • tfe-'V--:: ^
documented achievements of the Mercury, GeioinJk, and Apollo programs.-
Acting on the conviction that the practice and innovations of
NASA n. . . could be transferred by intmitatixm, extrapolation or
2 '
analogy to urgent problems facing other sections of the society"
NASA defined and sponsored research into specific candidates for :
. ' . ' " .
manageana&e technology transfer. •
•'.:." ;,;V"-:.:
•S"-" .• "!l "-.»
'.'V",.V-
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This effort was directed toward identification and
I
dissemination of advances in knowledge and practice from the space
program to other private and public endeavors. Commencing in 1961,
NASA sponsored a series of major studies of". . . aerospace-
contributed innovations in management technology which may be use-
ful to other sections of economic (and governmental) activity."
This section is drawn from the published literature, and is
included here (a) as a review of management technology which has
been previously identified for transfer; (b) to define and reference
for the interested reader a comprehensive set of technologies, all
of which did riot find application in the action-research phase of
the current study; and (c) to provide examples of applications of
the management philosophy discussed below.
PUBLISHED RESEARCH "
Published research categorizes NASA contributions in the
theory and practice of management by their experience in evolving
and innovating advanced methods of (1) conceiving, (2) planning,
(3) administering, and (4) evaluating large-scale enterprises.
Each of these categories is described, defined, and summarized
below. Special attention is given to current and past applica-
tions which will aid in the identification of techniques applicable
to client problems to be defined in the action research phase of
the study.
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CONCEPTUAL CONTRIBUTIONS
The conceptual contributions reported in NASA management
technology transfer literature include methods of anticipating the
future and methods of conceiving the large-scale endeavor.
1. The Future
There are two basic underlying conditions governing anticipa-
tion of the future: either the future will be continuous with the
past (that is, the causal variable system can be projected or
extended in some way); or the future will be discontinuous with the
past (that is, the relevant causal variables will themselves
shift). NASA extended knowledge in both areas.
A. A Continuous Future
In the first area—the extension of the past—NASA developed a
highly sophisticated technique for including probabilistic esti-
mates of equipment reliability and maintainability. By considering
these factors in the early stages of program development, it is
possible to estimate and manage time, cost and resource'constraints
before the critical date development and production stages.
Reliability Analysis is based on extension of known data and
included in Table 1 together with references to specific current
transfer applications. While current applications are in areas of
hardware development, and appear on the surface to have-limited
utility for the practitioner of planned urban change, the concept
of use of probabilistic estimates should not be lost. Often, when
a complex system is composed of many individual probabilistic
17
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factors, the pyramid or assembly effect of the individual factors
taken together provides an overall result which in counter-
intuitive.
B. Discontinuous Future
NASA's critical need, however, was the capability to predict
the future when the relevant variables shifted and accurate
probabilistic estimates were not available. Only through future
projections could informed management decisions be made concerning
the allocation of limited resources (time, talent, budget, etc.)
toward the most effective approaches to NASA's goals.* There were
three contributions to forecast of a discontinuous future: Tech-
nological Forecasting, Environmental Forecasting, and the Delphi
Technique. Each is summarized with references in Table 1.
2. The Large-scale Endeavor
The "systems approach" enabled a comprehensive analysis of a
large-scale endeavor which included concepts of interrelationships
and interfaces of systems, subsystems, and metasystems (that is,
the realization that there are levels of systems, and that every
/ '
system can be treated as. a subsystem in some other higher level
system). Table 1 includes references to current transfer 'litera-
ture. Most discussions of "systems analysis" center upon tech-
niques developed in practice. The discussion in Chapter IV below
*0ne characteristic of NASA is that NASA functioned with
clearly specified goals. This may not be true of management within
an urban complex. See Chapter IV (NASA Management Philosophy) and
subsequent discussion below. ;
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of the "systems philosophy" is in response to the technique bias of
current literature in anticipation that the concept is relevant for
management within an urban large-scale system. •'.
PLANNING CONTRIBUTIONS
To design is to plan; that is, design is the process of
making decisions before the situation arises in which
the decision has to be carried out. It is a process of
deliberate anticipation directed toward bringing an
expected situation under control.^ 4
NASA planning contributions centered upon extension of the
conceptual contributions into Ackoff's concept of "deliberate anti-
cipation." There are two main thrusts in current literature:
. 1. The use of a planning tool to anticipate,,the overall impact
of the totality of the relevant factors on the organization.
"Systems Design" and "Planned Program and Budgeting System" are
specific examples of tools designed to coordinate the system as a
whole.
2. The use of a planning tool to manipulate a large number of
variables in an effort to establish the impact of varying a single
variable or specified variable set. "Computer Aided Design,"
"Simulation," and "Heuristics" are examples.
Table 2 contains a summary of current literature with reference
to specific applications.
ADDITIONAL CONTRIBUTION—THE NASA PLANNING MODEL
An addition to the planning contributions, identified during
the course of the current study, was NASA's Process for Planning.
NASA developed a "participative planning model" to involve line
21
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management in planning when the initial "expert staff" prepared
plans proved inadequate. The NASA Planning Model is covered in
detail in the next chapter.
ADMINISTRATIVE METHODS
The Administrative Methods NASA designed or developed to deal
with the complex requirements of the space program includes the
greatest number and variety of aerospace contributions to manage-
t
ment. These techniques are defined and described in Table 3, and
include technological administrative devices (such as CPM, PERT,
etc.); new organizational concepts (Matrix Organization, Functional
Management, Modular Planning and Production, etc.); and legal
innovations (Quasi-Public Government Corporations). Certain NASA
techniques, such as Configuration Management, overlap single cate-
gories.
EVALUATION METHODS '
Established in 1963 by presidential directive, the Inter-
departmental Committee on Economic Impact of Defense and Disarma-
ment established with the federal government a concern with the
interrelationships and impact of federal programs upon the country.
NASA designed an approach, Environmental Impact Analysis, to
assess the impact of the space program on society.'
Subsequently the approach was extended by the Department of
Health, Education and Welfare to other areas of interest.
Table 4 summarizes the; .extant transfer literature with' reference
to current applications, ,-v •<•..'•..•'•- •- .-•<•'..: > .-; •
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CHAPTER III
THE NASA PLANNING PROCESS: AN ADDITIONAL TRANSFER TECHNOLOGY
This chapter discusses the NASA Planning Model. NASA's process
for planning was identified in the preliminary efforts of the cur-
rent program, and constitutes an addition to the NASA transfer
technology literature. •
NASA PLANNING PROCESS
The complexities of NASA, together with its far-ranging mis-
sion and lack of off-the-shelf technology, generated the need for
.HI effective system of planning. NASA's initial planning system
was "carried over from a previous government experience in NACA and
DOD," and continued the previous concept of division of responsi-
bility between planners and managers. A "Planning Group" of
experts prepared plans for managers to critique and then follow.
This proved ineffective in practice. NASA was to comment on these
earlier planning efforts:
. . . there (was) little institutional planning ...
interrelationships, programs, plans and institutional
consequences must be more effectively defined and
understood.2
As well as the need to plan from the institutional point of
view, NASA also identified the need for involving bright young
engineers and managers in the planning process. A case in point
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was the controversy surrounding selection of lunar orbit (instead
of earth orbit) for launch of the Apollo Lunar Excursion Module
(LEM).*
The initial planning, recommending earth-orbit, was performed
! - '
by, a group, of senior staff members. Dissention arose from several
Junior engineers (characterized as "Young Turks") who had developed
an alternative plan using lunar orbit.
! Convinced that the lunar-orbit technique was superior, they
attempted to submit their alternative for review—and ran into a
bureaucratic stone wall. The plan was stopped at local levels from
being forwarded for consideration. One "Young Turk," putting his
job in jeopardy, bypassed the hierarchy and submitted the plans
directly by personal letter to the NASA Administrator, who then
initiated further review of the alternatives. The lunar orbit was
selected, and NASA management identified the need for providing a
structure within the organization to ensure adequate consideration
of all alternatives for future problems. Additionally, the short-
ness of the "technical half-life" of the space scientists was high-
lighted—when a scientist becomes a manager his technical knowledge
can become obsolescent rapidly—even before he realizes it—and a
process had to be designed to ensure input from those "on the
firing line." -
*The author is indebted to Mr. William Flemming, NASA Office
of Program Planning, for making these points during an interview
with the author and other NASA/Drexel Team Members on October 3,
1969.'. ..-.
STRUCTURE OF NASA PLANNING PROCESS
NASA's planning effort was redesigned to involve line
personnel rather than to leave planning totally in the hands of
a staff group. It was anticipated that this participative approach
would be more effective, since the persons who would have to carry
out the plan would be committed to it at the outset. It was also
expected that better trade-offs among conflicting alternatives
would be made if the managers.and engineers directly involved took
3
part in the planning process.
The redesign of the planning process took the following
structure:
1. Creation Of Planning Steering Group .
The Planning Office—which had been charged with program
planning—had this function removed and replaced with the
"steering group" responsibility of aiding operational
managers (formed into "Planning Panels") to do the actual
program planning. The Planning Steering Group was to aid,
support, provide administrative services, and guide the
various planning panels in program planning.
2. Formation of Planning Panels
For each program area (there were ultimately twelve) a
Planning Panel was established. Chaired by a senior NASA
official from NASA Washington, it consisted of members
assigned from both "field installations" and headquarters.
Each Planning Panel was charged specifically and
individually with short, medium and long-range planning
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in its program area. Personnel assignments were made on the
basis of technical expertise, anticipated implementation or
mission involvement,and/or facility.requirements. Addi-
tional members were assigned for coordination among pro-
grams and across organizational divisions.
3. Appointment of Advisors arid Evaluators
Ideas and involvement of persons from outside the NASA
establishment were utilized to: (a) provide inputs that
the in—house people may have overlooked, and (b) critique
the process of planning itself. Scientists from outside
were asked to join certain of the planning groups.
BELLCOM (Division of A.T & T) was employed to prepare a
formal evaluation.
4. Integration and Review Board
Integration of program plans coming from the various
planning panels and review from an overall point of view
was performed by a Review Board of Headquarters Program
Office Directors and Facility Directors. The total pack-
age was then forwarded to.the NASA Administrator.
5. President's Space Task Force
Chaired by the Vice President, this group was the formal
tie to Executive and Congressional areas of government.
All mission plans and budgets were approved and con-
trolled by this body.
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It is interesting to note that while the Space Task Force was
the formal link, informal contacts were numerous. The Administrator
considered the informal "Politics" to be as important as the direct
administration of NASA—and arranged his schedule to allow com-
4
parable time for each.
SUMMARY
This chapter has discussed the inadequacy of NASA's initial
planning approach, that of an "Expert Planning Group," and
described the participative planning process developed in response
to those inadequacies.
A summary of the reasons for involving NASA line management
f
and "Young Turks" in participative planning includes:
1. The technical expertise and detailed data exist only (or
are most accessible) at operating levels of management (i.e., top
management do not possess the skills or information contained at
lower levels within their organization which is often implied in
the usual hierarchical bureaucratic organization).
2. The time required was too short for independent divisional
assessments, correlation and integration, at management levels,
and re-cycling for modification and trade-offs.
3. The plan was written on a policy (as contrasted with a
detailed procedural) level. Plans of this nature are either made
or broken by those who implement them. Involvement with plan
development creates commitment toward making it work, and builds
lines of communication which are necessary for successful
implementation.
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CHAPTER IV
NASA MANAGEMENT PHILOSOPHY
Research was conducted into NASA's philosophy of management
and the concepts which governed the design of. specific management
tools and guided operational decisions. This was done for several
reasons: (1) the anticipation that any specific tool developed
for NASA may require adaptation when applied in an urban setting,
(2) the recognition of ". . . the necessity for managers to base
their actions not on a rigid set of principles . . . but instead
to recognize that these actions must be adapted to the particular
situation, organizational levels, and human personalities involved,"
(3) to better understand the milieu in which the tools were
utilized, (4) to better understand the tools themselves, their
rationale and purpose, (5) to provide a philosophical and pragmatic
base for transfer; that is, while a particular tool may not be
appropriate for direct transfer to the urban environment, it may
be useful in modified format or may exemplify certain ideas or
concepts which may be useful in another format.
James Webb wrote that action preceded theory in the management
of large-scale endeavors:
Many of today's large endeavors, and many of those
proposed, have management requirements that go beyond
the proved capabilities of present forms and methods.
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Scholarship and research in the disciplines on which
future management groups must draw have not been able
to keep pace with the need in such large endeavors.2
Webb himself provided the thoughtful basis for this analysis
3
in his McKineey Lecture Series, and this writer amplified,
elaborated and discussed the implications for urban systems in
subsequent conversations with him.
MAJOR AREAS
Four major areas have been tentatively identified. Each area
interacts with the others. The current breakdown is somewhat
arbitrary and serves to focus attention on salient points:
I. Systems Approach
II. Environmental Considerations
III. Organizational Disequilibrium
IV. Second- and Third-Order Effects
I. THE SYSTEMS APPROACH
The basic concept underlying the "systems approach" is that
the activity of any part of an organization has some effect on the
I
activity of every other part.* It is therefore necessary to identify
and evaluate their combined impact on performance of the organization
as a whole. This concept is"generally accepted in.principle . . .
but seldom followed in practice."
^Systems Analysis is now an accepted element of management
study and industrial practice. Operational definitions, however,
differ. One recent author relates twelve and cites several
hundred more.^
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Webb followed the system concept in NASA management practices.
He considered:
Piecemeal attacks simply will not work. Neither will
limited concepts of systems engineering or systems
management .... Our integrated systems approach has
proved vastly more effective than the independent
components approach of the past for the solution of
problems in dynamic situations such as are encountered
in space and in weapons development.6
There are three elements of the "systems approach" as practiced
by NASA, which extend the generally accepted "state of the art":
A. Differentiation and Integration of-Task Activities
B. Use of a Behavioral Systems Approach
C. Extension of the system's concepts into the realm of
problem-solving
A. Systems Differentiation and Integration
The attention NASA paid to the integration of the diverse
activities within the organization is an important element of the
systems approach. Harvard University characterized this in a
model of NASA functioning, which Harvard constructed under contract
to NASA. The model was based on the findings that an organization
consisting of separate, task-oriented subunits must be wary of sub-
optimization. That is, as well as the need for differentiation of
tasks within the organization, there is a complementary need to pay
attention to the integration of subunits, processes, etc., to
achieve optimal organization goals.
These complementing functions of differentiation and integra-
J
 - -f
tion take place simultaneously. The need for integration of highly
differentiated subunits leads to conflicts, and these conflicts must
be resolved if integration is to be achieved. Successful integra-
tion in NASA was achieved through the emergence of a strong and
respected integrator function which did not decide or resolve con-
flict themselves, but caused the subunits to confront their
8differences. In practice the integration function ranged from the
complex computer-based configuration management system utilized for
control of the interaction among the many spacecraft components
(such as the electronic characteristics incompatability among
experiments) to committees of key personnel (such as the integra-
tion and review board portion of the planning process) and assign-
ments to key individuals (the key example, of course, being the
Vice President's assignment to oversee the whole program from the
head to incorporate space activities within the overall national
priorities.)
B. Behavioral Systems Approach
Although the systems analysis literature does not so specify,
the systems analysis schemes reported in practice tend to be input-
output analyses. That is, they tend to accept and describe the
situation as it is and manipulate parameters to maximize output,
minimize costs, or obtain some desired function of the two.
Changing the elements of the situation to manipulate the "as it is"
factor is not often reported. Ken Boulding, the noted economist,
provides a itongue-in-cheek definition:
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A system is a big black box
Of which we can't unlock the locks
And all we can find out.about
Is what goes in and what comes out.
Perceiving input-output pairs,
Related by parameters,
Permits us, sometimes, to relate
An input, output, and a state.
If this relation's good and stable
Then to predict we may be able,
But if this fails us—heaven forbid!
We Ml be compelled to force the lid!^
It was found by NASA that one must "force thellid" and deal
with behavioral, individual, and social parameters of organized
activity.
From a theoretical viewpoint, the need for this extension from
the so-called "mechanical output-oriented approach" to a behavioral
input-oriented approach recently has been the subject of extensive
research by Dr. Russel Ackoff and an interdisciplinary team at
the University of Pennsylvania. Ackoff concluded that the "output-
oriented" approach of systems sciences in building models to meet
mechanistic problems has not been successful in solving behavioral
problems. Behavioral problems have fundamentally different charac-
teristics from mechanistic problems and, because of this, systems
' •.'*.
models for behavioral problems must be developed using an input-
oriented research focus rather than the traditional output-oriented
one.
Their findings were summarized in four key points:
1. Behavioral problems are fundamentally different from
mechanistic ones, even .though the mechanistic problems
may have important behavioral elements.
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2. Solving behavioral problems requires an understanding
of the behavior; solving mechanistic problems requires
only a knowledge of the behavioral factors.
3. An out-put oriented research focus has been unsuc-
cessful when applied to behavioral problems because
it results in a model which describes the bhoices
people make, and description provides only knowledge
of the behavior.
4. To understand the behavioral elements in the system,
researchers must seek an explanation for peoples'
actions . . ,H
Thus, there is a fundamental difference between the assumptions
required to analyze behavioral problems and those required to
analyze the behavioral aspects of mechanistic problems. The dif-
ference is caused by the way the problems are formulated, in par-
ticular the degree of control which the decision maker believes he
possesses (or potentially possesses) over the behavioral aspects
t'.
of the problem. In behavioral problems, the research objective is
to identify how to change the behavioral patterns of the people in
\,
the system in order to achieve specified objectives. In mechanistic
problems, the behavior patterns of the individuals in the system are
considered to be uncontrollable, and thus the research objective is
12to adapt to the behavior in order to achieve objectives.
This concept has also been described by Robert Chin in his '
characterization of "Systems" versus "Developmental" Models and
13their utility for practitioners of planned change.
A
C. Extension of Systems Concepts into Problem Solving
-. . • ./-> . - • - . - - •
According to current literature, a full description of any
system ". . . requires the spelling out of (1) the specific expected
accomplishments, and (2) the specific mechanisms and procedures
14
which are to be used in the process."
However, one characteristic of the large-scale endeavor is
that the "specific mechanisms and procedures" are uncertain or
unknown. They must be invented. The Apollo moon program, for
example, required diverse technologies to be discovered, invented,
extended or applied in new ways to make the program a success.
One way of looking at this situation is Thompson's. In his
simplified schemata, decision issues always involve two major
dimensions: (1) beliefs about cause-effect relations and (2)
preferences regarding possible outcomes. Each dimension contains
a range of values. To illustrate the issue, Thompson examines the
end points: certainty or uncertainty regarding causation and cer-
tainty or uncertainty regarding outcome preferences:
Preferences Regarding Possible Outcomes
Certainty Uncertainty
Beliefs about Certain Computational Compromise
cause/effect
relations Uncertain Judgmental Inspirational
Computational
Where there is agreement on outcomes and mechanisms are known,
Thompson characterizes the decision process as "computational."
The"computational" box includes the techniques we have been dis-
cussing as "systems analysis."
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Compromise
It is interesting to note here that the urban complex is
characterized, unlike NASA, by a multiplicity of goals. This
process of compromise—bargaining and negotiation—becomes primary.
In fact, systems analysis is often used to support specific goals
on points of view, and not to achieve resolution of the conflict.
For a discussion of the bargaining approach in the political
arena, the reader is referred to Lindblow's notion of "disjointed
incrementalism" and Karl Popper's "piecemeal social engineering."
Archibald compares and contrasts these;and other approaches in an
insightful paper presented to the Canadian Treasury Board in 1969,
18in which he calls for an Hegalian Synthesis.
Judgmental
The extension of systems analysis into the judgmental areas is
of interest"here. It is this researcher's conviction that NASA has
pioneered the extension of "systems analysis" into regions of
uncertainty regarding causation. NASA called the judgmental
19
approach one of "Problem Solving."
Problem Solving
Established organizational forms and procedures are
inadequate to meet today's requirements. They must be
supplemented on a regular and continuing basis by ...
adaptive, problem-solving, temporary systems of
diverse specialists, linked together by coordinating
executives in organic flux.20
Problem solving in NASA was enhanced by attention to several
factors:
0
 Development of cooperative relationships among groups
and individuals.
0
 Designing communications which flowed laterally as well
as vertically.
0
 Development of competence in interfacing organizations
(especially non-NASA and non-government)
Cooperative Relationships
NASA noted that the competition among techniques applicable to
the solution of a particular problem could not be permitted to
escalate into competition between the persons or groups advocating
21the various techniques. There was always attention to the need
to ". . . maintain the essential basis for cooperation between
responsible groups within the framework of representative govern-
22
ment." This was extended to contractors and other organizations
interfacing with NASA, to the extent of aiding other organizations
to increase their competence as described below. Additionally,
temporary task forces were established as required to bring
experts together for a particular problem or to establish needed
coordination. (One primary example is the NASA planning process
discussed earlier).
Lateral Communications Flow
The free flow of information, laterally as well as hier-
archically, was routinely practiced by NASA in problem-solving
efforts. The classic "chain of command" was modified or ignored
in their perceived need to open-up all communications channels in
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their quest for task accomplishment. Engineers, Scientists,
and Managers were instructed to communicate directly with their
counterparts and other persons in other organizations as necessary
to "get the job done."23
NASA's empirical attention to the role of communications and
information flow in problem-solving efforts has theoretical support
in an analysis by R. E. Walton concerning lateral organization rela-
tionships and information flow as they impact problem-solving and
24bargaining in organizations.
Of primary importance is the way in which lateral organiza-
tions make co-ordinative decisions. Walton distinguishes between
a bargaining, and a problem-solving type of decision process. In
bargaining, the orientation of the parties is "how much will I gain
or lose?" In problem-solving, the orientation is joint exploration
for solutions which involve maximum gain to both parties considered
6 'together.
The information shared in bargaining differs dramatically
from the problem-solving situation.
In the problem-solving process maximum use is made of
voluntary, open, accurate discussion of an area which affects both
groups.
The opposite is true in a bargaining process: each partici-
pant attempts to gain maximum information from the other but to
make minimum disclosure himself; he often tries to manipulate
and persuade the other; and he examines the implications of
actions for possible unfavorable consequences for himself, but
does not concern himself with the consequences for the other.
According to Walton, the problem-solving process is exploratory,
problem-centered, and a form of collaboration; bargaining is
defensive, issues-centered, and a form of conflict which inhibits
25problem-solving.
Walton experimentally studied the processes of bargaining and
problem solving from the point of view of decision structure, data
flow, and attitudes of participants. His experimental data
indicated:
1. A decision structure for bargaining will provide fewer
interactions than a structure for problem-solving. (This conclu-
sion is justified if one focuses on the amount of accurate
information exchanged--not necessarily if one focuses on the total
amount.) Information is carefully rationed and deliberately
distorted.
2. Where the decision process is of the bargaining type,
there will tend to be less experimentation in decision practices,
procedures and organization. Inter-group interaction is rigid,
formal and circumscribed.
3. Conflictful decision process, bargaining, leads to
negative attitudes between organizations; cooperative problem-
26
solving leads to positive attitudes.
There data are summarized in Figure .2/
Figure .?
Characteristics of Bargaining vs.
Problem-Solving Decision Processes
Decision Making Between Lateral Organizations
Decision Process
Characteristics Bargaining Problem-Solving
Goal Orientation
Information
Data Content
Accuracy
Attitudes
Observed inter-group
processes
Individual
outcome and
gain
Minimum
disclosure,
maximum sought
Overstatement,
distortion
info used to
support individual
goals
Negative between
Rigid, formal
Joint outcome
and gain
Maximum
disclosure of
data, maximum
sought
Accuracy
sought
Positive
between
Adaptive and
experimental
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Development of Competence in Interface Organizations
In the keynote speech at the Drexel University seminar oh
application of NASA Management Technology to urban problems,
Webb touched on one factor which had not been previously reported.
Under his administration, NASA directly and specifically sought
to increase the skills, capabilities and resources of organiza-
27tions which interfaced with NASA.
To critics who pointed out that this would aid t;he establish-
ment of a power-base which NASA might not be able to control, Webb
replied that (1) NASA's functioning would ultimately be enhanced,
(2) a problem-solving attitude was necessary for creative solutions
under the severe time constraints of the Space Program, (3) blame-
placing attitudes which result from concealing data, problems,
etc., would slow the ultimate goals of a man on the moon, and (4)
involving outside organization would serve both to check and
balance—and as additional resources.
II. ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS
We know that the environment within which every such
system must operate is itself an essential part of the
system, especially as it is seen by its management
leaders. But how to measure or assess this environmental
element is little known.28
The "integrated systems approach" NASA proposed was extended
to include the environment in which NASA functioned. The need for
this was clear—as a student of public administration, Webb had
observed long-run factors decision being "... the outside rather
29
than operational or technological considerations."
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As .under Secretary of State under Dean Acheson, Mr. Webb was
responsible for reorganizing the State Department, along the lines
recommended by the Hoover Commission, and he had experienced the
.".. . . incongruity between the organization structure and the
methods and procedures of the Department, on the one hand, and the
requirements raised by the jjapidly changing environment in which
our foreign policy was being conducted, on the other."
THEORETICAL BASIS
there is a theoretical basis available for understanding
these environmental aspects which NASA dealt with but did not
adequately know how to measure or assess. Based on the "socio-
technical systems approach" associated with the Tavistock Clinic
Institute of Human Relations (London, England), the theory base
initially established the relevance of the relationships between
organizations and their environments in the trail-breaking work of
31Emery and Trist, and has been extended through the work of
32 33Lawrence and Lorsch in the United States and McWhinney in the
United Kingdom, to include consideration of organizational forms
and applicability of various decision-making processes.
CAUSAL TEXTURE OF THE ORGANIZATIONAL ENVIRONMENT
The causal texture of the environment is relevant in two
ways; as related to the total environment in which the organization
is embedded, and as related to those portions of the environment
which the sub-units and individual members experience as occupants
of organizational space. The latter is important as the
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organization can "degrade" the "textural complexity for its members
by certain techniques of buffering."
The total organization, however, must recognize the complexity
of the environment in which it operates and develop its strategy
accordingly.
Emery and Trist employ a continuum in the causal texture which
differs in the degree of uncertainty and in the degree of inter-
dependence exhibited between the parts or regions of the environ-
ment. Four ideal types are defined.
The first three of these types have already, and indeed
repeatedly been described in a large variety of terms
and with the emphasis on an equally bewildering variety
of special aspects .... The fourth type, however, is
new, at least to us, and is the one that for some time-' .'
we have been endeavouring to identify Together,
the four types may be said to form a series in which
the degree of causal texturing is increased in a new
and significant way, as each step is taken.34
It Placid, Randomized Environments
In the simplest type, goals and noxiants are relatively
unchanging in themselves and randomly distributed. A critical
property of the organization is that there is no difference between
tactics and strategy, and organizations can exist adaptively as
single small units.
/
:2. Placid, Clustered Environments
The next type is also static, but goals and noxiants are not
randomly distributed; they "hand together" in certain ways. The
need arises for strategy as distinct from tactics. Organizations
grow in size, become multiple and tend towards centralized control
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and coordination. It is possible to identify sources (causes)
of events; make (Probablistically) useful statements about future
occurrences and select "best" actions. Most of our physical
science knowledge assumes and/or bears on such environments. The
process of study is typified by the near independence of the
observer from the observed.
3. Disturbed Reactive Environments
The third type is dynamic rather than static. It consists of
a clustered environment in which there is more than one system of
the same kind. Organizations seek to improve their own chances by
hindering each other. Between strategy and tactics there emerges
an intermediate type of organizational response—what military
theorists refer to as operations. Control becomes more decentral-
ized to allow these to be conducted. Stability may require a cer-
tain comlng-to-terms between competitors, as in cartel formation.
In these Type 3 environments, an interactional relationship
exists between the observer and the environment such that one cannot
make statements about the world independent of the knowledge of the
position and intents of other individuals and organizations.
Social science knowledge becomes increasingly important in under-
standing Type 3 environments.
4. Turbulent Fields
The fourth type is dynamic in a second respect, the dynamic
properties arising not simply from the interaction., of identifiable
component systems but emerging also from the environment. The
turbulence results from the complexity and multiple character of the
causal interconnections. Individual organizations, however large,
cannot adapt successfully simply through their direct interactions.
Action must be taken to respond to the environmental factors.
Normative value structures emerge as a basic response to uncertainty
and provide a control mechanism when commonly held by all members in
a field.
MODALITIES OF DECISION MAKING
In each environment there is a mode of decision making which
fully uses available information, but does not require further
35
assumptions. McWhinney calls this mode "appropriate" and
establishes an hierarchy based on Knight's earlier taxonomy of
36
certainty, risk and uncertainty within decision-making.
McWhinny adds a fourth class which hescalls "domain problems."
Domain problems are associated with the question of what
aspects of the environment are to be of concern, of what phenomena
should be noticed and of what variables should be introduced into
the criterion function for assessing the organization's performance.
The deepest problem of leadership is that of selecting the domains
of concern, Just as the significant question of scientific research
is the choice of the domain of phenomena to be investigated and
37the domain of criterion of evaluation.
The revised taxonomy of decision making modalities couples
with causal texture in significant ways.
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Certainty is the only modality appropriate to Type 1 random
38placid environments. Randomness precludes any probabilistic
elements; outcomes (both goals and noxiants) are known. Often
isolation from higher order decision modes is created by buffering
techniques—accepted assumptions, filtered information; physical or
temporal seclusion—all can perform an "uncertainty or risk absorp-
39tion" function.
Computational techniques are available for aiding decision
40
making under certainty.
Risk is defined as the knowledge of probabilistic occurrence
within the environment, and the assessment of decision strategies
in light of that knowledge. As such it provides a meaningful
41
approach to Type 2 environments.
Statistical techniques are available to aid decision making
42
under Risk.
Uncertainty includes the situations in which probabilistic
statements cannot be made because of either lack of knowledge or
because of the mutual interaction among competing organizations.
Decision techniques available (taxonomy by the author) include
44Uni-actional paradigms (such as the Minimax Technique) which
establish decision criteria no matter what the competition may
45decide, and trans-actional paradigms (such as Game Theory) which
brings the strategies of possible joint action into consideration.
(See Appendix G for a relevant experiment.)
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Domain Problems
Within the domain problem, each of the problem elements is
incompletely formulated at the start. The perception of reality
and the criterion function emerge out of the process of selection.
The process locates new dimensions or elements or reality and
assigns values to them. Often;the knowledge of this incomplete
formulation of the problem is itself obscured, and only becomes
known as action based on available knowledge fails to achieve
results. The crisis often generated then forces a return to the
evaluation of the basic issues and a search for elements which may
have been overlooked or which fit together differently from that
assumed.
The elements of a domain problem are not so easily isolated
and studied as those of well-defined problems. In the terminology
of Vickers, solving a domain problem is an "act of appreciation:"
"An appreciative system (is) a net of which the weft and warp are
reality concepts and value concepts .... Reality concepts
classify experiences in ways which may be variously valued. Value
concepts classify types of relations which may appear in various
46configurations of experience."
The act of appreciation beings in noticing which aspects of
the environment are of concern.
Once awareness has been accorded to some phenomenon of the
environment, the involved object or event has been valued; it has
competed for attention and has been accepted. The development of
the mental awareness into a domain of concern is one of joint
57
development of the evaluation of facts provided by a search and of
the reality testing of the values concepts in the context of other
prior valuations.
An "act of appreciation" essentially restructures the world
from the decision-maker's point of view.
It is this writer's observation that solution to the "Domain
Problem" is analogous to Thomas Kuhn's analysis of scientific
revolution, and that any manager attempting to apply techniques
•developed for one situation in a new one must be prepared to adapt
them within the context of "Domain Issues." Kuhn also points out
the anxiety and disillusionment: often experienced by scientists
faced with the need to restructure their work, perceptions and
thinking. It is this anxiety which the current researcher felt
in his work in the black :community, and, which resulted in the
turning to philosophical constructs for guidance in the Action
Research phase of the program. See Appendix C for .a short discus-
sion.
SUMMARY
The relationships among environmental characteristics, organi-
zatiorinpropertias and decision-making modalities is summarized in
Figure 3.
SUPPORTING DATA
Although NASA had not drawn the parallel between the theoreti-
cal material presented above and their own functioning, it is clear
that the NASA Administrator considered)himself in a turbulent
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environment. *
This view is supported by the mechanisms NASA implemented to
deal with the environment:
A. Top Level Management Effort
As a continuing policy, the Administrator spent fifty percent
of his time on affairs outside of the NASA organization—dealing
with Congress, presidential liaison, public speeches, and so forth.
B. Effort to Gain and Maintain Continued Support
The time span before pay-off required that NASA gain continued
support ". . . if we did not organize effectively and use methods
and procedures that could Insure support, there was simply no way
for us to transform ourselves into a space-faring nation."
But the large complex endeavor does not lend itself to the
same visible proof as do routine endeavors. "The method, then,
when results are not available, is to judge by the process being
employed." In order to do this, NASA had a policy of:
. . . welcoming congressional participation in areas where
49
committees as mentioned have proper concern.
maintaining relationships of mutual respect and trust ...
"frank person to person exchanges."
*The author is indebted to NASA Colleague, Thomas Michael, for
pointing out this parallel, and suggesting that the NASA Administra-
tor functioned in a turbulent environment. Webb therefore
functioned to allow the environment within NASA to be of lower
textural complexity for its various departments, divisions and
individuals. , ,
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C. Communications Network .
Designed along the basis of prior experience with reorganization
of the Department of State, "... (the organization was) structured .
to ensure open lines of communications hierarchically and laterally,
to keep the flow and accumulation of data under control, and to
provide the top echelon with a continuing feedback of information
on performance against policies, decisions and instructions."
III. ORGANIZATIONAL DISEQUILIBRIUM
The problem facing NASA was to "have a man on the moon and
bring him home in this decade (the '60's)." As has been noted
earlier, while the goal was clear the means were not. Furthermore,
the environment in which NASA operated was "... unpredictable
53
and sometimes turbulent." In contrast to the typical organiza-
tion designed to meet present conditions, NASA's organization had
to be designed to meet future unknown conditions. This Webb called
". . . maintaining desired disequilibrium." NASA was squarely on
the twin horns of a dilemma: designing for disequilibrium allowed
rapid adaptation but also jeopardized the management need for
control. In order to achieve disequilibrium, one had to accept
instability.
NASA designed their organization to permit rapid response and
reaction to:
The turbulent unpredictable environment;
Signals of incipient failure.
t- " ,
Indications of emerging opportunity.
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The necessary level of instability was accepted. The features
of uncertainty in the environment within which NASA had to operate
were recognized and taken into account. I believe NASA's record,
covering a brief ten years, shows that for success in its large-
scale endeavor, an essential supplement to competence in overall
management has been the ability to achieve and effectively use
maneuverability and flexibility—that is, the capacity to adjust
to and to move forward in an unpredictable and sometimes turbulent
environment. Without this capacity, overall management competence
is critically deficient.58
59NASA called this "dynamic equilibrium" and designed a
coordinated system of management controls, systems of executive
selction and evaluation andcontractor selection and procurement
62procedures to enable the organization to function in the face of
uncertainty.
IV. SECOND AND THIKD ORDER EFFECTS
The National Academy of Arts and Sciences conducted a
comprehensive study sponsored by NASA, into the relationship
between large-scale endeavors and society. One of the more
thought-provoking findings was:
In the conduct of human affairs, our actions inevitably
have second-order consequences. These consequences are,
in many instances, more important than our original action
.... Technical changes have proved to be particularly
explosive sources or second-order social, economic, and
political changes that were never envisioned. This
arises largely because at the beginning technical develop-
ments tended to be viewed in a rather restricted con-
text. They are seen as an answer to an agreed problem
and tend to be judged in terms of their adequacy in
solving the problem. 63
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NASA considered the high-order effects as a matter of
deliberate policy. (See, for example, the techniques for
Environmental Impact Analysis cited in Chapter I.)
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SECTION III
ACTION RESEARCH
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OVERVIEW OF SECTION III
This section reports the testing of the assumption that certain
NASA Management technology can be applied or adapted for use within
an urban complex.
After intensive preparation and analysis of NASA Management,
the decision was made to go ahead with the plans to test the applic-
ability of the NASA techniques through "Action Research" within a
particular urban system. The sociological technique of participant-
observer would be utilized, with the added dimension that members
of the research team would take management responsibility within
the system.
Subsequently, the research site was selected. Specific prob-
lem areas were then identified, evaluated and attacked with applic-
able NASA management techniques. .
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CHAPTER V
ACTION RESEARCH SITE
Selection of an action-research site was critical. The "host"
government would be expected to profit from the professional
resources and NASA technology to be made available. But it ran
the risk of having outsiders "meddle" with their situation, and
perhaps, create additional problems by their presence.
The Drexel Research Team articulated a set of criteria (hereto
appended in Appendix C) which established the minimum conditions
for a successful relationship and negotiated for entry to an urban
system. .
SITE SELECTION . .
Four possible sites were evaluated:
1. 'TrenttogtN. J.
The newly elected Mayor, Arthur Holland, utilized the
services of the Drexel Research Team and members of the Rutgers
Faculty as a "Transition Task Force." All city department heads
were being replaced, and other major shifts in personnel were
being implemented as the new government took over. Mayor Holland
needed trusted professional assistance to maintain continuity of
government. The effort was successful. The Drexel Team asked to
maintain the relationship and use Trenton as the action-research
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site. Negotiations dragged on for several months, and were finally
terminted when the Drexel Team chose New Castle County.
2. Washington, D. C.
Preliminary negotiations were held with representatives from
the mayor's office, Washington, D. C. The Drexel Team elected not
to continue them due to the extensive travel which would have been
involved.
3. Wilmington, Delaware
Through, the services of the Greater Wilmington Development
Corporation (GWDC), the Mayor of Wilmington was approached. After
initial talks, the Mayor decided not to use the Research Team.
4. New Castle County, Delaware
Again through GWDC, the County Executive was approached.
After two months of negotiation, an agreement was made for the NASA
Research Team to work as special assistants to the County Executive
on projects to be selected by him. NASA techniques were to be
applied as appropriate..
NEW CASTLE COUNTY
New Castle County consists of the northern-most section of
Delaware, one of three counties comprising the state. It has,
however, nearly seventy percent of the state population; and an
estimated ninety percent of the income.
Within ;-New Castle County are eleven incorporated areas—the
City of Wilmington, the City of Newark, and nine smaller towns.
69
Each incorporated area has its own first-level of government. For
the unincorporated areas, the County Government is the closest
government to the people. Table 5 summarizes population data, (and
includes data for the DeLaWarr and Belvedere sections to be discussed
more fully in the author's Action Research described below).
Table 5
POPULATION CHARACTERISTICS
' ' ' ' ; ' ' Population
State population 500,000 (Eat.) .
Mew Castle County 386,000
Incorporated areas 123,000
Unincorporated,areas 263,000
DeLaWarr. 18,000
Belvedere 5,000
The present organization of the county government was estab-
lished by state law in 1967. A change was made from the so-called
"Levy-Court" system dating from colonial days to the establishment
of an executive system with division of responsibility between the
executive and county council.
The County Executive was elected-at-large, as was the County
Council president. Six councilman were elected from various
districts.
The 1967 reorganization established functional responsibility:
County Council•
County-Council was responsible for approval of financial
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operations, operating budgets, capital budgets, debt creation,
bond issues, and the setting of the tax rate. In addition, council
established basic service functions (police, ambulance, trash, etc.)>
approved union contracts, employee pay plans; and maintained
responsibility for approving and amending the zoning ordinances.
County Executive
The County Executive was given the broad responsibilities for
administering the County Government on a day-to-day basis. He
was empowered to make appointments and remove appointed officials
at his pleasure, prepare and administer budgets and services, and
enforce laws.
The County Executive appointed a Chief Administrative Officer
to assist him in the management of the government. At the time
there were departments of:
0
 Public Works
0
 Parks and Recreation
0
 Development and Licensing
0
 . Planning
0
 Finance
8
 Transportation
0
 Personnel
Each was headed by an official appointed by the County Executive.
Department staff were appointed under civil-service merit system,
although it was estimated that half the employees had received
appointments through an earlier patronage system.
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As the government was only two years old, the County Executive
considered his tenure as a "shakedown effort" to establish a viable
modern government in the fastest growing portion of the state. The
five NASA-Drexel Research Associates were considered supplemental
staff (See Appendix D) to the County Executive, and would work on
mutually acceptable tasks, which would be identified in the "Entry
Phase" of Action Research.
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FOOTNOTES
1. These and following data are from a personal interview with
Mrs. Francis Andrews, Public Information Officer, New Castle County,
October, 1970.
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CHAPTER VI
PROBLEM SELECTION
ENTRY
t
The Drexel team began its work in New Castle County on the
first of October, 1970. Problem "identification and entry" had been
scheduled for a two- to three-month period. However, within days of
the initial handshake, a crisis arose. Citizens were shouting and
picketing. National news media were televising what the county
executive, Mr. William Conner, termed "his hottest and most sensi-
... • " i
tive problems." County and state officials were afraid of a
repeat of a "Watts" type incident several years earlier which
resulted in martial law being declared and National Guard Troops
patrolling the streets for several months. ' ,
PROBLEM ASSIGNMENT
The particular problem facing county officials was the use and
disposition of an abandoned shopping center located in the DeLaWarr
area, a low income neighborhood located south of Wilmington, toward
New Castle, Delaware. Residents had become inflamed when the
vacant, vandalized shopping center, at the only entrance to their
community, was scheduled to be made into an automobile body shop.
The citizens demanded that the county purchase and develop the
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property as a site for a satellite center of the new Delaware
State program for delivery of social services.
This research associate was asked to represent the County
Executive in evaluating the problem and in participating in its
solution.
The task was accepted for three basic reasons:
Satisfying the immediate need from the County's point of view
would establish credentials and competence of the NASA/Drexel Team,
and aid in the (humorously termed) "dog-sniffing" phase of a
consulting relationship.
This research associate was specifically asked to assume
responsibility for the problem, and the NASA/Drexel Team agreed.
It was a new arena for this research associate to experience.
Prior effort had been within or in behalf of the business community.
It was an opportunity to experience a community viewpoint.
As will be discussed below, the direct early involvement of
this research associate created several problems: (1) the
client's interest was paramount, the scientific design became
secondary,* (2) the NASA/Drexel Team became split. This research
associate's tasks were performed most often in the evening hours,
and with governments and agencies outside the county government.
*This was highlighted during a community meeting when it was
decided not to administer a previously designed scientific instru-
ment which measured prejudice and conflict behavior. At the time,
it appeared that the procurement of data concerning these
behaviors would produce the behavior itself, and sidetrack a
problem-solving effort. x
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The remainder of the team worked primarily within the county
government during normal.working hours. While information was
shared periodically, an intensive working relationship was not
maintained due to task differentiation and scheduling problems;
(3) The first two stages of action research (Initial Entry,
Orientation and Exploration) were cut short and overlapped the
Action phases.
THE DE LA* WARR PROBLEMS
The immediate problem was to prevent civil disorder. The
secondary, but pressing, problem was to identify and correct both
the immediate and underlying issues. The tertiary problem was to
enable the county organization to better respond to these kinds of
problems in the future—problems for which there was no existing
structure or precedent.
Immediate [Problem—-Civil Disorder
As representative of the County Executive, this research
associate met with leaders from the Ad Hoc Citizens Group, and
conveyed the message:
1. The County Executive was personally concerned.
2. the research associate was to be his link with the
community.
3. The legislative process must be followed for a social
program of the magnitude of that demanded.
4. The County Council would schedule an informal hearing at
/
which time a proposal should be submitted (about six
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weeks hence).
For the next month, the Ad Hoc Group was encouraged and
supported in their activities of:
1. Reviewing the "presenting problems" (the Body Shop) and
developing a set of alternative possible solutions for property use.
2. Defining the need for social services in the DeLaWarr
region—justifying the request for a social service center.
3. "Touching bases" with contemplated resources (State
Department of Social Services, Planned Parenthood, Bureau of Child
Welfare, etc.).
4. Preparation of the presentation to County Council.
At the same time, an independent evaluation was conducted to
itemize comprehensively, for decision-making in the executive
branch of government, the parameters, interest groups, goals,
objectives and criteria surrounding the project.
PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION
Preliminary investigation and data collection resulted in
several dimensions of the problem:
1. Statistics (income employment, venerial disease, etc.)
for the contiguous black and white neighborhoods in the area were
equivalent, as were other demographic, health and social indica-
tors.
2. The DeLaWarr area, from the point of view of the individual
citizen, was disorganized. There was no local government. The area
had little political "clout."
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3. Several agencies—school administration, juvenile
authorities, police, welfare and other social services—had indi-
vidual programs designed to aid the community but there was no
communication and coordination of the various activities.
4. Current programs were planned from past history and
statistics.. There were no antennae listening for new or different
problems.
5. Resources were available from several levels of govern-
ment, and various public and private sources. These were also
uncoordinated.
6. There were several processes or mechanisms at work
simultaneously (which sometimes tended to get in each other's way):
a. Legislative—iCounty Council directly; State Legislature
indirectly.
b. Administrative—County Executive, State agencies, private
agencies.
c. Social—The beginning of agitation among the residents.
d. Legal—Land use and other civil statutes.
e. Expert—The various expert opinions and studies of the
area.
7. There was lack of agreement about which problems were
causal, where were symptoms, and who should take action about what.
8. There was, especially among the black community, a feeling
of personal incompetence and conviction that government would not
respond to their needs.
\'
9. There were critical socio-economic problems—lowest income
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in the County, highest rates of poverty and unemployment, high
Afertility rates, incompleted family units, low education profiles
(See Appendix E for a full description).
COUNTY COUNCIL ACTION .
The Ad Hoc Committee presented their proposal to the County
Council of November 17, 1970. Without consulting this writer or
the executive branch of county government, County Council shortly
afterward voted to expend capital funds for a Social Service Center
2in DeLaWarr. The County Executive declined to intervene, as
preliminary research had supported the need for social services,
and the state had informally restructured budget allocations to
support a facility. -
Thus, the problem shifted from "decision among alternatives"
to one of "making it happen." Problem selection became problem
assignment.
*Either father or mother not living in the home.
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FOOTNOTES
1. Private communication.
2. See Minutes, County Council Meetings, New Castle County,
Delaware, for December 1970 and January 1971.
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CHAPTER VII
"THE PROBLEM
The goal was clear: create a Social Service Center in DeLaWarr.
Mechanisms for achieving this goal were unclear. As a part of the
NASA/Drexel Action-Research Program, this research associate was
given the responsibility by the County Executive for achieving the
goal of a Social Service Center. Additionally, and of equal
importance, civil violence was to be stemmed; and capability was to
be built within the county government for handling these kinds of
problems which tended to "fall through the cracks" of the highly
departmentalized bureaucratic organization.
Although there was later found application for certain ele-
ments of specific tools, it was NASA's management of uncertainty
(i.e., Problem-Solving to meet clear goals with cloudy means in a
turbulent environment) which pointed the way towards solution of
the problems at hand.
APPLICATION OF NASA MANAGEMENT PHILOSOPHY
The remainder of this Chapter contains an analysis of the
DeLaWarr problem from the point of view of NASA Management Phil-
osophy. Organization of the Chapter follows the conceptual
presentation of NASA's philosophy from Chapter IV. New theoretical
material is included as it is relevant for understanding the
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particular DeLaWarr situation and the selection of appropriate
action strategies. The Chapter ends with detailed "Implications
for Action."
I. Systems Approach
It was apparent that individual functions were proceeding
individually. State and County police had minimal effective
cooperation. Juvenile authorities* welfare services, the school
system, social service agencies, all had programs, all were
uncoordinated, and none were in communication with county officials
except on an ad hoc or casual basis. .
As was indicated in the previous chapter, preliminary investi-
gation uncovered the need for a systemized approach.
A. Differentiation and Integration
The various resources from public and private sources, at sev-
eral levels of government, were not coordinated., A strong,
"integrator function" was needed. ; .
B. Behavioral Approach
Working with the Ad Hoc Committee brought to light two key
elements of behavior which were heretofore not considered fully,
if at all, in decision-making by the county: 1. The extensive
feelings, of rage and feelings of personal impotence of people
throughout the community, and 2. the community in general looked
upon county government (and all government) as opponents to be
ridiculed and mastered. Both theory (discussed below) and the
author's experience pointed towards decreased communications and
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increased conflict between community and government, which could
be expected. Explicit consideration of these elements led to the
clinical interventions which are described in the following
chapters.*
1. The Person
Harvard University has recently completed a psychosocial
analysis of "Black Power" and its implications for Community
Development. Charles Hampton-Turner made an eloquent statement:
Control of the way a problem is set confers great
persuasive power. The person with this control comes
into any discussion or negotiation playing on his home
ground. He has mastered the rules and structures.
Often, his adversary can be placed in an untenable
position or the agenda can be set so as to permit
only one outcome . . .3
Stokely Carmichael makes the identical! point in his book,
Black Power, quoting a children's classic:
"When I use a word," Humpty Dumpty said in a rather
scornful tone, "it means just what I choose it to mean-
neither more nor less."
"The question is," said Alice, "whether you can make
words mean so many different things."
"The question is," said Humpty Dumpty, "which is to
be the master—that's
It was the feelings of individuals from the black community
that the county government maneuvered situations so that the
only outcome could be that "the blacks lose again," and that they
were unable to change this situation.
*This 4s an example of an "Act of Appreciation" within a
turbulent environment decision-making process.
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Both Hampton-Turner and Carmichael—the former from theory
and the latter from experience—reached similar conclusions: The
solution lies not in preconceived ends but rather in processes
which result in persons creating their own reconciliation of their
problems. Thus, as problems are solved, competence in creating
solutions is enhanced, and feelings of impotence and powerlessness
are reduced.
2. Group to Group Relationships
We define a "group" as a social unit which consists of a
number of individuals: A. who, at a given time, have role and
status relationships with one another, stabilized<in some degree,
and B. who possess a set of values or norms regulating the attitude
and behavior of individual members, at least in the matters of
consequence to them.
Sherif experimented extensively with groups, especially with
conflict behavior and showed conclusively "contact as equals" to
be effective in reducing existing conflicts between groups and
changing attitudes of their members.
Information is subordinate to the existing state of
relationships between groups, and actually succeeds
in changing this state only when it contains definite
evidence of a shift in relative power . . . otherwise
. . . favorable information about the advisory is ignored,
is reinterpreted to fit one's own designs, or is other-
wise ineffective as the sole means of reducing intergroup
conflict.7 ^
Sherif summarized additional conclusions concerning group to
group behavior:
1. Intergroup conflict and its by-products of hostility
and negative stereotypes are not primarily a result
of neurotic tendencies on the part of individuals,
but occur under conditions specified here even when
the individuals involved are normal, healthy, and
socially well adjusted.
2. Cooperative and democratic procedures within groups
are not directly transferable to intergroup situations.
3. Important intergroup relations affect the patterning
of roles and the norms within each group.
4. Contact between hostile groups as equals in contiguous
and pleasant situations does not in itself necessarily
reduce conflict between them.
5. Contact between groups involving interdependent action
toward superordinate goals is conducive to cooperation
between groups, but a single episode of cooperation is
not sufficient to reduce established intp.rgroup
hostility and negative stereotypes.
6. A series of cooperative activities toward superordinate
goals has a cumulative effect in reducing intergroup
hostility. This cumulative effect involves the
successful development of procedures for cooperating
in specific activities and their transfer to new
situations, so that established modes of intergroup
cooperation are recognized.
7. Tools and techniques found useful in problem-solving
within groups and in intergroup conflict may also
serve in intergroup cooperation. But their use in
intergroup cooperation requires recognition that
the procedures involve not merely so many individuals
within a group, but different groups of individuals
contributing to the attainment of a common goal.
8. Cooperative endeavor between groups toward super-
orginate goals alters the significance of other
measures designed to reduce existing hostility .
between them:
Intergroup contacts in the course of striving toward
vsuperordinate goals were used for developing plans, for
making decisions, and for pleasant exchanges.
Information about the other group became interesting
and sought after, rather than something to be ignored
oi interpreted to fit existing conceptions of the
out-group. i . .
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Exchange of persons for the performance of tasks
was not seen asv"betrayal" of one's own group.
Leaders found that the trend toward intergroup
cooperation widened the spheres in which they could
take positive steps toward working out procedures
for joint endeavor and future contact.**
C. Problem Solving
Problem solving is that judgmental process NASA used when
goals were agreed upon but the means for achieving them were not.
As noted extensively in the previous chapter, there are several
critical factors:
1. Cooperative group relationships.
." .
G
 •
2. Lateral communications flow.
3. Competence in interfacing organizations.
The implications for action were stated earlier and will be
summarized below. '
II. ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS
There were inconsistencies in perception of the environment
between the county government and the community. The county
government had been in process of becoming organized with a central
executive function, most appropriate for a Placid, Clustered
Environment. The process was difficult: several department heads
complained to NASA/Drexel Research Associates about the inability
to get policy directives and leadership from "the top." The
department heads noted the lack of a strong executive, blamed it
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on either the personalities involved or the "system"* but assumed
that there ought to be strong central authority.
The environment in fact seemed to this observer to be at
least Disturbed, Reactive—with some strong turbulent elements.
Certainly, issues such as the psycho-social dynamics of Black
Power and the Group to Group relationships discussed above include
critical issues of domain: what aspects of the environment are of
concern, which pehnomena should ibe noticed, and what are the
criteria for the organization's performance?
It was not in this researcher's charter to investigate the
interesting possibility that the inability of the"organization to
coalesce around a strong central authority was not due to person-
alities (the system, etc.) but to the organization's need to
function in a higher-order environment. Suffice to point out that
the perceived need for centralization was inconsistent with the
environment relative to the DeLaWarr issue.**
The environmental textural considerations (Types 3 and. 4)
pointed toward the need to provide action interventions which
enhanced decentralized flexibility and fostered cooperative
relationships.
*Never defined when the question was asked, "What do you mean
by 'system'?" during extensive interviews conducted with New Castle
County officials during the initial phases of action research.
**However, there were five research associates, and at least
several Action Research projects were undertaken within the
organization at lower orders of complexity, due to buffering
characteristics of the organization.
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The continued examination of the environment to identify and
resolve the domain problems was of critical importance.
III. ORGANIZATION DISEQUILIBRIUM
There were two organizational groupings for the researcher
to work with: the Ad Hoc Committee and the County Government.
A. Ad Hoc Committee
The Ad Hoc Committee was essentially an already unstable
citizens group which moved rapidly into areas of "emerging
opportunity." However, much of the efforts seemed like "random
motion."* There was too much instability. Some method of
guidance:was needed to keep the group on course.
I
B. County Government. ,
The county government, on the other hand, exhibited great
inertia in organizing to meet problems which crossed departmental
lines or required! modification of current procedures.**
Observation by the author.
**Two NASA/Drexel Research Program colleagues conducted an
Organizational Development (O.D.) project in which they worked
directly with the County Government to improve its effectiveness.
In the last month of the action research period, this Research
Associate was asked to establish an interdepartmental task force
and work with it in organizing the resources of the county to
meet the DeLaWarr problems. Perhaps the effectiveness of an
O.D. program is dependent upon a critical need from the client's
point of view (not the consultant's). That is, the O.D. approach
is best approached in support of a task or goal of the client,
and not as an end in itself. This is an area for further
scholarly research.
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IV. SECOND- AND THIRD-ORDER EFFECTS
Paying attention to the interaction of task accomplishment,
psychology of the individual and sociology of the group are
examples of higher-order interactions. An additional example
with negative impact was the removal from the tax rolls of the site
selected for the center.
IMPLICATIONS FOR ACTION
The implications for action are summarized in the following
table and are translated into an action program in the next chapter.
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FOOTNOTES
1. Sites, Lt. E., County Police, personal communication.
2. Hampton-Turner, Charles. "Black Power, A Blueprint for
Psycho-Social Development," in Rosenbloom and Karris, (Eds.)
Community Development; Working Papers.
3. Ibid., p. 66. Emphasis in original.
4. Carmichael, Stokely, and Hamilton, Charles V. Black Power,
The Politics of Liberation in America. New York: Vintage, 1967,
p. 36.
5. Sherif, Muzeifer. In Common Predicament. Boston: Houghton
Mifflin, 1966, p. 12.
6. Ibid., p. 88.
7. Ibid., p. 86.
8. Ibid., pp. 90-93.
9. Siegel, S., and Michaels, T. Ph.D. Theses, unpublished.
Available from Drexel University Library, Philadelphia, PA.
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CHAPTER VIII
ACTION PROGRAM
 (
DE LA WARS PLANNING PROCESS
The NASA Planning Model is an articulation of a process which
involves line and staff management together with resources and
v - • • '
operational representatives in a participative problem solving
effort to develop feasible programs. As was stated earlier, the
NASA Participative Planning Process was developed in reaction to
the failure of NASA's previous planning technology: an "Expert
Staff Planning Group."
NASA's situation was analogous to urban planning failures.
Urban planning by "experts" alone doesn't work* In a review
of a new New York City Comprehensive Plan, Ada Louise Hustable,
New York Times critic of urban planning, wrote:
. . . the textbook scientistic-Utopian planning of long-
range policies based on statistical extrapolations and
translated into massive rebuilding schemes has proved
such a conspicuous failure in the last 25 years that
doctrinaire planning, and its adherents, are in con-
siderable disrepute and disarray. The impressive
theories and presentations that seem so intellectually
compelling go up in smoke when faced with the human and
political equation ...
Therefore, the (new) plan deals with the processes;
with the forces of growth and decay and the inconstant
human factors that underlie the city's serious disorders—
things that cannot be pinned down on charts or graphs.
It is designed for the greatest flexibility.^
New York City was not alone. New Castle County had also had
its problems with urban planning by experts. The "Operation Break-
through" effort previously had failed, and there were numerous
instances of other failures in various programs of housing and
social improvement.
The first step toward the achievement of a DeLaWarr Social
Service Center was the establishment of a system to plan it. The
failure of urban planning, as told so eloquently by Huxtable,
added to the researcher's conviction that the planning effort had
to be designed for a complex, dynamic environment. Measures which
would stimulate coordination and cooperation and enhance the
identification of forces, issues, needs and solutions as acts of
adaptation and appreciation were needed.
NASA's participative planning process provided a basic
structure for planning the DeLaWarr Center. The NASA structure
f
deliberately involved those with the most direct and complete
knowledge of the Issues, and the problems, together with those
responsible for carrying out the plan, thus generating the best
technological approach with commitment to making it work.
ESTABLISHMENT OF A NASA-TYPE PLANNING PANEL
It was, therefore, decided to appoint a Planning Panel to
prepare the short and longer range plans for implementation of
the DeLaWarr Social Services Center. The extant Ad Hoc Committee
was the basis for the Planning Panel, augumented by community and
governmental resources.
This accomplished the following:
1. Gave stability and direction to the Ad Hoc Citizens .Com-
mittee, which reduced disfunctional excessive disequilibrium.
2. Transferred the divisive conflict and civil disobedience .',
into constructive problem-solving effort.
3. Provided a mechanism for government to be-responsive to
community needs, thus providing an experience which was dissonant
with previously held attitudes of community members toward govern-
ment, and,produced a force towards disequilibrium.
4. .Provided an opportunity for government to learn of com-<-
munity needs and priorities first-hand, thus providing the oppor- '.
tunity for a restructuring of value systems and an "Act of
Appreciation." ;
5. Established a responsive outlet for individual "rage"
which could turn it towards the seeking of constructive solutions.
6. Provided an opportunity for community members to develop
feelings of competence by actually developing competence. .
7. Developed community commitment to the plan once made.
8. Developed a super-ordinate goal which promoted satisfactory
group to group relationships.
9. Enhanced Problem Solving by providing lateral exploration
of issues and information and maximizing interpersonal interactions
in the participative process.
10. Provided a forum with maximum disclosure and discussion of
.all relevant issues—economic, political and social.
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In order to achieve a. viable Planning Panel, there had to be
consideration of the other elements of the NASA Planning Process
Structure.
Planning Steering Groups (PSG)
The function of NASA's PSG was to aid, support, provide
administrative services and guide the Planning Panels. This
researched assumed the PSG duties. In this case, there had to be
specific attention to:
1. Top level support and genuine commitment!from legal
authority. The County Executive affirmed that the Planning Panel
was not a device to "buy time."
The Planning Panel functioned with the participation of
governmental resources and was charged with the goal of ultimately
creating a viable center.
2. Clear Statement of Mission. This was necessary to provide
a superordinate goal.
3. Frequent Task Meetings—to provide full flow of informa-
tion and harmonize interpersonal contacts.
A. Involvement of other individuals and groups as additional
skills and resources are needed.
Integration and Review Board
This function was performed by this researcher and the County
Executive on an ad hoc basis.
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NASA CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT
The need for a strong "integration function" was apparent.
Not only were county departments pursueing essentially independent
courses of action, but coordination among various levels of
government, and public and private resources, was almost non-
existant.
The formal Configuration Management System was applicable,
but cumbersome in this situation. This research associate per-
formed the "integrator function" personally.
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FOOTNOTES
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CHAPTER IX
IMPLEMENTATION IN DE LA WARR
IMPLEMENTATION .
The Planning Panel was established and the citizens' Ad Hoc
Committee was legitimized by having each member formally appointed
by the County Executive. Additional nominations were solicited
from community leaders to enable the Committee to be representative
of all geographic, racial, economic, etc., subgroups. Exhibit 1
is the letter appointment. There were twenty-seven original
members.
The citizens' Ad Hoc Committee was empowered to work in four
main areas:
1. Need Identification and Procurement
Determine required services
Arrange for them
Coordinate among them
2. Facility
.'.'.. Prepare facility requirements
Recommend architect
3. Operation '
Prepare operational requirements
Coordinate among the identified services
Prepare to meet changes as required
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EXHIBIT I
May 21, 1971
Your interest in the Community Services Center which is 'being
planned for the former Oakmont Shopping Center site is greatly
appreciated by your County officials and by your fellow citizens. I
am hereby appointing you to the Community Center Advisory Committee,
and I am asking that you give us the benefit of your advice and help
in advising and carrying out a worthwhile program ,of community
service from that Center serving the entire DeLaWarr School District
area.
It will be the Committee's function to help us to design the
precise physical facilities to be erected on the site; to help
decide which social service programs shall be furnished at the
site; to decide whether the site should include a social and com-
munity center for the immediate neighborhood; to recommend what out-
lying facilities might be provided in other neighborhoods;-and to
recommend what services might use the community center as their base
of operations.
We are anxious to have every interested community in the
district represented on this Committee and expect to enlarge it
somewhat. I am reserving the right to ask for the resignation of
anyone who is not able to attend the meetings and contribute to the
problem.
I would appreciate your letting me know promptly if you cannot
serve. I have asked Mrs. Deborah Wailes to act as Temporary Chair-
 v
man, and she has called a meeting for Wednesday, ^ une 2, 1971, at
7:30 p.m. in the County Council caucus room at the Public Building,
llth and King Streets, Wilmington, at which time the group will
select its own Chairman and other appropriate officers. My repre-
sentative on the Committee will be Mr. Mason Cadwell, consultant to
New Castle County government.
Thank you for your willingness to serve and best wishes for a
successful program.
Cordially yours,
William J. Conner
County Executive
WJC/smc
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4. Proposal
Prepare proposal for federal grant monies
The committee functioned initially to define the problems
relevant to their goal of a social services center, and identify
additional resources which would be relevant.
A. Problem Identification
As well as the initially presented problem of the "Body
• i
Shop," there were—and are—underlying problems of juvenile delin-
quency, health and social welfare, drug abuse, medical and dental
problems. These first identified problems served as the basis for
initial organization around which additional problems were identi-
fied for solution.
!
B. Resource Identification '; •
In addition to the known and requested resources of the
Delaware State Social Service Department, these additional
resources were contacted and involved:
1. Other governmental functions (Juvenile Correction,
Department of the Ageing).
2. Citizens' Groups (Civic Associations and Federations,
Ad Hoc Committees, Volunteer Fire Departments).
3. Professional Service Groups (Planned Parenthood, Com-
munity Action).
4. New Castle County (Police Human Relations, Library,
Parks and Recreation).
5. 'Local School System.
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An effort to develop the linkages necessary to the total
effort was started. :i
Bringing together the various resources to attack the problem
»
required cooperation among groups which heretofore had been pur-
suing more or less independent courses of action. Several activi-
ties were taken to build these links. This was a continuing
effort, and required a delicate balance between achieving the
desired participation without creating unreasonable expectations
or otherwise jeopardizing the effort.
A. County Executive—State Department of Social Services
A "Confrontation Meeting"^ was held by the county with the
director and key staff from the State. The agenda consisted of:
1. How each sees his own problems and priorities.
2. How each views the other's problems and priorities.
3. How we can work together.
4. Who else should be included. ., . .
'-
1
 <.
This meeting was successful. It ended with ah off-the-record
summary in which each organization candidly stated where it stood
and agreement was reached on a plan for further action.
B. Federation of Civic Associations ~
In order for the Social Service Center to be viable, it must
draw its clients from the surrounding community as well as in the
l . -
immediate neighborhood. The immediate neighborhood was black.
Surrounding this were white communities, roughly equivalent on a
socio-economic basis. The county supported an effort springing
from the people to weld the various different neighborhoods
. }' ' . ' .' v
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together. The effort was in the critical stages of initial
organization, and is known as DEAL—DeLaWarr Environmental Aware-
ness League.
C. Other Resources i
As relevant resources were identified they were contacted,
informed of the DeLaWarr effort, and invited to participate
REDUCTION OF RACIAL TENSION
An additional problem in the DeLaWarr area was the racial,
tension between Blacks and whites.
Through their functioning, the committee would work on the
• •'
"Tasks" necessary to make the social center a reality.* But
their functioning would be also the first step in the "Process"
of blacks and white working together. In solving the tasks before
them, links would be forged between black and white. The positive
experience would help reduce the racial tension which existed
between them, and assist in the development of personal competence
for the participants.
That this was successful was evident when a white community
leader took me aside after a meeting—one at which a lot was
accomplished—and said, "God damn it, Mace, these niggers, I
mean blacks, are really people. I could even be friends."
That meeting, in fact, was the point where I observed the
thrust of the weekly meetings shift from a bargaining attitude to
*Note that these "Tasks" were in support of a superordinate
goal, and not "merely a pleasant situation." See p. 84.
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one of problem solving. Prior to then, each group, in the meeting
strove for kccomplishmentvvis-a-vie the other. Information, goals,
desires, values, strategies were concealed from each other until
they were useful in accomplishing something specific. When prob-
lem solving^became the primary modus operand!, these data, goals,
and so forth, were shared more openly in an apparent effort to
i
accomplish a superordinate goal, which would benefit all.
RESEARCH ASSOCIATE FUNCTIONING
For the next year, this Research Associate assisted the Ad
Hoc Committee in their functioning in several ways:
1. As "Process Consultant"—"stopping the action" to examine
what was going on in the committee meetings, to provide atten-
tion toward disfunctional or limiting behavior and encourage stabil-
ity and acts of appreciation. For example, there were (especially
in the beginning) many instances of incongruent communications
? • -
(usually the words did not agree with the way they were said).
When confronted, the communicants realized data was being filtered
to meet preconceived notions—and when quality of communication
changed, attitudes changed also. (As a side note, one had to be
very careful to pick the right timing for this kind of an inter-
vention. If intervention were premature, it tended to reinforce
the conflict. There is no explicit advice for the reader'to follow
in deciding the timing of the intervention. For me, the decision
seems intuitive and based on experience. Perhaps there were subtle
• ' . 1
cues from the exchange that the quality of communications was
v .
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' •
starting to shift, and then the consultant clarified what was •"•.
happening and reinforced it. )
A case in point was consideration of inclusion of the Police
Family Crisis Intervention Unit in the Social Services Center.*
Initial discussion got nowhere. For several weeks, the contro-
versy raged. Then the patterns emerged. Each reason "pro"
generated a strong rationale against. Ground shifted from week to
week—and very seldom repeated itself. Finally, this researcher
intervened to have the Ad Hoc Committee examine the process which
had been taking place. That is, an examination hot of the content
of what happened but how it took place. In the ensuing discussion
the patterns, emerged of subgroups and individuals, who consistently
took one position or another. In exploring the patterns, addi-
tional data emerged: those against were afraid that "the govern-
ment and white community wanted police controls in the Black
area/' Those for had been bullying and not listen-ing,
. , ; . . , - • S , . ' " • * • :
The result was that communications became possible, and the
issue was settled. (An interesting point is that original plans
called for .only plainclothes FCI personnel in anticipation of the
*Family Crisis Intervention (FCI) is counseling technique used
by the New Castle County Police Department to try to get to root
causes of family problems—marital strife, runaways, etc.— so that
they will cease to require periodic police action.' The FCI Unit
developed as a part of the police defining their role in the
community as a service organization in contrast to'the punative
thrust found in many police departments.2
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police-station issue—but subsequently those who were previously
against the concept made a minimal uniformed enforcement capability
part of their approval requirements.)
2. As a link from the Committee to resources—As resources
which shoulli be consulted or involved were determined, the research
associate functioned to get them together with the Committee.
Early in the year, this took some "arm twisting." Resources wanted
to be sure that the Committee was legitimate and.viable, before
commiting themselves to participation. This was especially pre-
valent among professional people who had had limited contact with
underprivileged people and had stereotypes based on local riots
several years earlier. Additionally, some were personally
frightened to come into an area whose potential for disorder had
been widely publicized. Later, as the Committee's activities
became known, potential resources asked to become involved.
3. As county representative—
i •.
Contact with the county was maintained to keep council and
executive informed, to ensure unrealistic or unreachable goals
were not set, and to allow this program to be consistent with
I : ' :
other administrative and political activities. This was achieved
through periodic meetings with the County Executive, and by having
• I , •. :
him participate infrequently in Committee deliberations.
These activities continued for over a year of Committee
meetings and integrative effort. Activities and interventions
I
were rejected which would have made the research associate role
one of "staff" to the Committee. The Committee had to do the
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work if competence were to be developed., It could not be done
for them. This was evident from the first. ' In the first meeting
with the Committee the research associate made a statement that
he could not solve their problems. He could help them solve them.
He had access to resources, personal skills in organization and
change which can help, but"he can't solve the problems that face
you." A reply, came from one of the blacks who had been agitating
for further;civil disorder. "We've been studied to death by .
eggheads who came,, talked to us, got up our hopes, and then left
and wrote some (stupid)*-paper for other (stupid)* eggheads and . •
nothing happened . . ." This was the first step in my becoming .
accepted--after the'reply, we started looking!: .
By Assisting'the Committee, but'not doing', the staff work, the
research1 associate accomplished the following: ;••>' ; . ;
1. Followed, the NASA Planning Panel Concept for planning in
a participative process. . •" •'• •".'• . •'•. ••'•• /.-.•" •. •••• • •. ••'.•.";/
: 2.
 : Observed the behavioral and sociological implications
of the committee in action—a first cut at Ada Louise Huxtable's
"... processes . . . forces of growth and decay, human factors
. . . that cannot be pinned down on charts or graphs." and prepared
for subsequent action based on the behavioral open systems model
described above.
3. Paved the way for the "system to respond to them, rather
than forging a mold in which they would be constrained (or
*"Stupld" is not the word that was used.
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co-opted). This met in an operational and evolutionary (contrast
with disruptive and revolutionary) fashion the issue of "...
white technology ... instrument of oppression."
4. Faced the personal issues of identity, competence, self-
confirmation.
5. Forced lateral relationships and a concurrent problem-
solving approach.
6. Met the problems of planning in a turbulent environment
in that maximum attention was paid to the requirement for allowing
significant forces, issues, etc. to emerge and not become blinded
by preconceived notions.
OUTCOMES
The Ad-Hoc Committee functioned successfully:
A. An operational statement of needs was determined and used
as the basis for initial facility planning and resource procure-
. y
ment. •
B. Resources with application to specific needs were con-
tacted and involved in the planning process.
C. Initial facility planning was conducted in conjunction
with resource personnel. An architect was selected.
D. A proposal for additional Federal monies was prepared, in
conjunction with involved federal agencies, and submitted.
E. An initial operating and organizational scheme was prepared.
While the Ad Hoc Committee was functioning successfully, other
related problems became apparent:
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1
 A. Black-white relationships in the community were not
particularly improving. Members of the Ad Hoc Committee functioned
in a cooperative manner; but this had little impact on the area in
general. '
B. County services were not coordinated. Each department
would participate fully in planning for the service center but
there was no effort toward integrated planning in other problem
areas.
 :
C. State, county, school and private services were also
still basically uncoordinated.
D. While county representatives who worked with the Committee
have developed excellent working relationships, county and state
officials were still looked upon in general by the community to be
essentially uncaring and unresponsive to their needs.
While wrestling with an approach to solve these problems,
• • • • ' / i
another crisis developed: shooting in Belvedere.
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FOOTNOTES
1. Invented by Richard Beckhart. See, for example, Beckhart's
volume in the Addison-Wesley Series in Organization Development:
Organization Development; Tactics arid Strategy, Addison Wesley,
1969.
2. Sides, Eugene, Lt., Police, New Castle County, private
communication.
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CHAPTER X.
BELVEDERE
Belvedere is another primarily black, disadvantaged,
unincorporated community in the county, with the county government
the closest government to the people. ,
PROBLEM
A thirteen year-old boy was shot and in the hospital in
critical condition. The community claimed racial conflict—
teenagers from the affluent Brandywine Hundred area were harassing
their children. An emergency meeting was called by concerned
citizens—an attempt to mobilize government resources to be
concerned with and to respond to their needs to stem anticipated
further violence. This research associate was asked to the
meeting by community leaders, as personal credibility had been
established by the DeLaWarr efforts. Present at the meeting were
representatives from:
Belvedere Community
County Recreation Department
County Police (who did not have jurisdiction)
County Executive's Office
State Police
State Department of Social Services
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State Department of Corrections
United Fund
There was much arguing and shouting. The tone of the meeting
was defensive. Nothing was accomplished or resolved. Outcomes
were:
1. Citizens were convinced that the State Police would not
step up patrols or otherwise take action because", . . we have to
patrol Brandywine Hundred, too." (Brandywine Hundred is where
many advantaged whites live.)
2. Issues of substance were not clarified nor were facts
clear. There were apparently some real problems underlying the
violence.
3. There were increasingly negative relationships between
government and citizens during the course of the meeting. Govern-
mental representatives who sympathetically reached out to comfort
the injured', boy1 s father were "slapped down" by other governmental
" . • t.
representatives.
4. There was noticeable lack of knowledge, coordination,
and cooperation among governmental agencies.
The meeting broke up with hostility on all'sides.
Subsequently, the State Police did increase their activities.
Community leaders redoubled their efforts to control troublemakers.
The hostility between government and community continued.
FURTHER EXPLORATION
Further exploration during the next week revealed that:
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1. There ware issues of substance, notably police services,
housing, traffic, streetlighting and recreation.
2. Coordination among government departments, levels, and
agencies'was limited.
3. There was genuine commitment from most government
representatives, from all levels, toward solving the problems and
working with the community.
4. There was genuine commitment from most community residents
toward working with government to solve their problems, and under-
standing that action took time and budgets.
There was agreement among the various individuals and groups
that the issues had to be clarified and solutions had to be sought.
Yet the-meeting called for that very purpose resulted in conflict
and hostility.
Subsequent personal interviews with meeting participants
about this issue identified two common trends:
1. From representatives of government: .
"The Belvedere people are trying to push us around and don't
understand the overall job we are trying to do. They want more
than their share."
2. From representatives of the community:
"The government isn't doing anything to respond to pur needs.
Brandywine Hundred is more important than we are."
Quite obviously, there were vast communication gaps. There
was much negative stereotyping and the factual information was
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being suppressed, misinterpreted, and otherwise filtered to meet
pre-existing convictions.
ACTION
The implementation of the Planning Panel in DeLaWarr was success-
ful in generating cooperative relationships toward the goal of a
community social service center. These relationships were necessary
in Belvedere. However, the time element did not allow for a long
sequence of meetings in which the relationships could be developed.
Thus, the action planned was to assemble the individuals who
would constitute a Planning Panel and meet together for a long
enough period of time to allow communications to take place. This
researcher had previously identified the gap between intentions
and outcome of the previous meeting. By focusing attention on this
gap, and the feelings and attitudes which created it, it was
hypothesized that the gap could be overcome.*
Thus, with the cooperation of the State Director*, of Social
Service Centers, and the Governor's Assistant for Human Relations,
an all-day workshop was planned to be held in the community, to
try to attack both the substantive issues and the negative rela-
tionships between community and government.
*The basis for this was established during the 1970 Boston
University Seminar for Consultants in Organization Development,
in which the author, together with seminar participants, used
workshop techniques to overcome adverse police-community
relationships in South Boston.
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SUMMARY OF WORKSHOP
Participants, ' •
New Castle County Government
County Executive
Department of Development and Licensing
Department of Parks and Recreation
Department, of Police
State of Delaware
Department of Health and Social Services
, University of Delaware
Department of Health
Belvedere Community
New Castle County Housing Authority
Local School System
Published Purpose
The purposes for the workshop, as promulgated to those
invitedt were simply for:
Government and Community to:
Explore needs and problems.
Involve resources,.
Establish lines of communications.
Plan for change.
What Happened
The morning was spent examining the attitudes, biases, habits,
assumptions and feelings of the participants toward society, toward
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existing organizations, toward each other, and toward themselves.
Surfacing these underlying factors enabled participants to
examine factors which were influential but often unstated and to
build preliminary bridges of understanding and trust to each
other. The need to explore underlying factors was evident from
the DeLaWarr experience (The police FCI controversy, for example).
The mechanism for this was a simulation game which included
elements of negotation and bargaining in a three-tiered low mobility
society.* The initial game state was carefully structured to
include a "mix" of bureaucratic and citizen representatives at each
level of the society.
The "game" went on only a short while when the lower society
levels banded together and confronted the "top level" with the
problems of being underprivileged. Using the game as a structure,
participants worked through the feelings-issues confronting
citizens and government today. This was fantastic and fascinating
as at each level of the game were representatives of all levels
of real life.
The end result was a genuine feeling for the agonies and
responsibilities for each participant in his real work role—both
*The game called "Starpower" was designed by R. Garry Shirts
as an experiential tool for raising questions about the function
of power in a competitive society. Details of the game are con-
tained in Appendix F. This game was selected based, on the writer's
positive experiences from other community groups who had played the
game. Apparently the experiential .methods of working through the
power and the emotional issues related to underprivledged areas
produces significant results in communication and understanding
among participants. This is an area for scholarly research.
those who look at themselves as being on the "short end of the
stick" and those responsible for provision of services—for them-
selves, and for each other.
As well as generating personal growth and understanding, the
game enabled group cohesiveness to be built across the previously
divided bureaucratic and community representatives. This was
necessary for the efficient use of the afternoon.
The afternoon was spent in self selected small groups exploring
the parameters of the Belvedere problem:
1. Stating critical needs.
2. Defining resources.
3. Planning for action.
4. Assigning responsibilities. <
WORKSHOP RESULTS
Results can be described on at least three levels—the level
of specific issue-oriented actions, the level of -communications,
and the level of the attitudes of community and government toward
each other.
A. Issue-Oriented Results
1. Key needs emerged; The areas of housing and recreation
were primary. Abandoned houses were not only eyesores degrading
the neighborhood, but were also used for drug traffic and prosti-
tution. The local recreation program was inadequate in both con-
tent and availability during evening hours. .
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2. Needed'resources were defined'; As well as the resources
which were anticipated (and invited to the workshop), there were
several state agencies and private "Red Feather" (United Fund)
organizations identified peripheral to housing and recreation
functions. These were the various welfare and support agencies,
the juvenile authorities, and State Department of Labor. Plans
were made to approach and involve these additional resources.
An additional resource proved to be the community itself,
especially in the identification of relevant needs and under-
standing the complexities of the Belvedere environment.
3, 4. Planning for Action and Assignment of Responsibility
Action plans emerged on several levels:
A. County Government: The individual Departments represented
indicated the need for their departments to become more responsive
to the community, and for additional effort toward integration
of various County functions. Each department woulai attend to the
problem of responsiveness; an interdepartmental planning group
would be established.
B. Intergovernmental: The need for involvement of additional
government functions and the integration among governments was
identified. The state social service representative assumed the
"integrator" role.
C. Citizen: The use of citizens from the community as a
resource was noted above. In order to function more effectively,
the community started the development of a federation of area
associations. Included were the "Young Gents;"the Belvedere
Civic Association, and the Fire Company. This amalgamation
resulted in inclusion of all known organizational and individual
strengths in a group which was expressly designed to perform within
the community on a continuing basis the communication and working
out of problems which was accomplished between government and
community during the workshop.
D. integrator Function: The need for integration among
private and public sectors was identified as the result of work-
shop exploration of the housing issue.
The problem of abandoned housing was noted, above. The county
had already taken title to the houses—but did not have the budget
for demolition. Additionally, those responsible for assigning
demolition priorities did not know of the prostitution and drug
issue. During the workshop these factors surfaced, and a new
solution was found. Eventually the quasi-private New Castle County
Housing Authority was planning new in-fill low income housing units
to replace the demolished housing. By transferring legal title
to the land from the county to the Housing Authority (and the
Housing Authority would get title later anyway), it was possible
to use federal program funds for demolition. Additional possi-
bilities, such as moving housing to these sites from houses con-
demned for highway construction was also considered, and those at
the workshop gave assignments to themselves to follow up all
possibilities.
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The need for an "integrator function" to coordinate the
actions of various interested persons and groups was apparent; work-
shop participants established an informal network among them-
i .
selves with specific plans to meet periodically over important
issues, involving additional resources and organizations as
appropriate.
B. Communication Results
Jockeying for position and the use of the communications
process in a competitive way was changed to joint exploration and
solution. An example is found in the recreation issue. Initially,
community representatives were complaining that the recreation
program had been cut in half. A governmental representative
responded by showing his budget which had been summarized by
computer in a comparison of current versus last year's actual
and planned expenditures. The computer printout showed the budget
almost doubled from one year to the next. This generated a shout-
ing match until some time later it was found that the current
year's budget included an allocation expense for department managers,
which had been absorbed in overhead the prior year. When these
facts became known, communications shifted from shouting to
exploration of what could be done within current limitations.
Another example was the statement by community leaders that
they had tried to communicate, but were continually shunted from
person to person, very politely, but with nothing ever accomplished.
Upon looking further, it was found that only three attempts were
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made In the last year, and that the unresponsiveness was left over
from the previous "Levy Court" form of government..
C, Attitudes
The indication of shifts in attitudes from conflict and
hostility to cooperation was fourfold:
0
 Reports from the participants after the workshop.
0
 Behavior of the participants relative to each other in
the workshop and for the weeks following the workshop.
0
 Outcome of a conflict measurement device administered
pre- and post-workshop to participants.
0
 Inquiries from participants and non-participants about
conduct of a workshop in other areas.
1. Reports from Participants ;
The author contacted each participant individually in the
week following the workshop and six weeks later, asking the fol-
lowing questions:
0
 Was the workshop worthwhile?
0
 Would you participate again?
0
 Have you talked to (government) (community leaders)
since the workshops? .-.•-'.
0
 Have you talked (with your associates) (in your community)
about the workshop?
All thought the workshop worthwhile and would participate
again. Close to 100% of the participants had talked about the
workshop with others in their environment; 30% of the community
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and 66% of the government representatives had .had contact with
each other in the following week (rising to 50% and 87%,
respectively, six weeks later).
i t,
2. Behavior of Participants
Behavior during the workshop was already noted. Post-workshop
action included several instances of support of the community and
responsiveness to problems. For example, a county vehicle was
dispatched to aid the Civic Association in moving an aged resident
thrown out of her home; a county recreation official met with
community teen-agers to determine a program which would meet
their interest, and citizens provided information 'to aid police
in drug enforcement.
3. Conflict Measurement Device
Using a game theoretical approach, the author developed a
measurement tool for assessing the dimension of conflict versus
cooperation, over the course of the workshop. The experimental
use of the tool is contained in Appendix G, Results were that
cooperation: was developed; however, scientific validity was not
obtained due to lack of control and placebo data for contrast.*
4. Inquiries
The author received inquiries requesting the conduct of a
*This is a good example of Action Research providing data
which can point toward an area for rigorous scientific study.
The author is developing a "programme" of follow-up investiga-
tion around the issues of a game theoretical approach to con-
flict and cooperation.
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similar workshop in other areas of the state,, concerning the
.. ' i. - •' . " '
establishment of a participative planning process, started by a
one or two day workshop. Specific issues were: suburban low
Income housing, rural social service delivery, and race relations.
The author either assisted as requested, indicated the need for
further preparation prior to an action program, or showed the
inadvisability of the requested technique for the specific prob-
lem. . . . ' .
OUTCOMES : • ;•'..•••
The relevant outcomes were two-fold:
A. An attitude of conflict and hostility was replaced by
cooperative problem solving.
B. the relationships established between community and
government served to:
1. Enable government to become more responsive to
community statements of need, and
2. Served to allow integration of effect without a
separate integrator function.
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FOOTNOTES
1. Author's notes from meeting. Quotation from state policeman.
SECTION IV
CONCLUSIONS
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SECTION IV
CONCLUSIONS
The premise of the NASA/Drexel Program was that management
technology developed for the space program could be utilized or
adapted for application to urban problems.
A clinical methodology, "Action Research," was adopted to
guide the operational implementation of selected technology to
solve specific problems in the DeLaWarr and Belvedere areas of New
Castle County. Within the conduct of the program it was found
that the management philospphy which guided NASA in development
of specific management tools to meet NASA's problems had relevance
to this researcher's efforts. Thus, the scope of the program was
expanded to evaluate the utility of NASA's philosophy and approach
to management as well as the application of specific management
tools to meet specific assigned problems.
Conclusions drawn from this study are summarized below from
!:
several points of view:
0
 Action Research Process
0
 Philosophy of Management in a Turbulent Environment
0
 NASA Management Technology
0
 Achievements in New Castle County
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ACTION RESEARCH PROCESS '
'• ' '. '
The Action Research Methodology provided that-action-
interventions be planned and taken in response to needs of the
: ' (
client system; and that these needs would be identified during
the clinical/phase of the NASA/Drexel Program.
It was therefore inappropriate for specific NASA technologies
to be identified for transfer in advance. The broad treatment
herein of NASA Management Philosophy and a display of available
technologies which provided a "menu" for technology transfer
selection, was an important preparation for working with the.
client system.
But the Action Research Methodology had a second important
impact: issues of problem selection, identification of aspects
of the environment which were of concern, pin-pointing the rele-
vant phenomena, etc., were not determined in advance. They were
determined in conjunction with the client in response to his
particular problems. And these issues are the specific issues of
decision making within a Turbulent Environment
Thus, the Action Research Methodology prevented premature
definition of the problem in order to meet available solutions,
and established an approach which ultimately resulted in the
identification of several sociological and psychological determin-
' • . - • . ' • -' I ' ' " '
ants of behavior (discussed more fully below) which previously were
-" 1"; . ... 'v
not included in decision making and problem solving activities
within the client system.
There was, however, a hazard of Action Research which was
confirmed by the current study:
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Location of Initiative Too Exclusively with the Client
Action Research calls for clinical activity in response to
client problems. At several points during the study, scientific
inquiry was sacrificed when there were apparent conflicts with
rapid achievement of client objectives. In retrospect, it is the
author's opinion that more longer-range benefits would have been
accrued, especially in generalization of this program to other situ-
ations, had scientific research not been aborted relative to
measurement of racial prejudice (p. 74) and a game theoretical
approach to analysis of conflict/cooperative behavior (p. 122 and
Appendix F).
PHILOSOPHY OF MANAGEMENT
A "turbulent environment" is one in which the dynamics arise
from (1) interaction among organizations within the environment,
and (2) discontinuities with past experience; that is, additional
factors and the multiple character of causal interconnections
require that effort be invested in the determination of relevant
factors and their impact on problems at hand prior to the applica-
tion of some tool or technique which may have been effective in
the past..
NASA Management Philosophy, as articulated in writings and
interviews with senior management personnel, was more relevant to
the specific action research performed by this researcher than
were the tools used by NASA in its own functioning. This was due .
to the turbulent environment in which the NASA Administrator arid
1
 j
senior managers functioned, and the buffering function performed
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at these levels to reduce environmental complexity for NASA
component subsystems (and thus the management systems used within
t •
NASA). the action research reported herein was also in a turbulent
environment; thus, the philosophy level was more useful than the
tool level for the planning of action interventions.
'' '
The specific elements of NASA Management philosophy were
articulated earlier (Chapter IV). Their application in the action
research phase led to several concepts which appear to have general
application within an urban environment.
1. The concept of turbulence led to a specific program of
identification of forces, issues, problems, etc., relative to the
situation at hand. It is this researcher's conviction that the
reliance on past history, and an inattention to discontinuities in
the present, lead to Huxtable's ". . . theories and presentations
that seem so intellectually compelling (but which) go up in smoke
when faced with the human and political equation . . ."
2. Psychological and sociological concepts were used opera-
tionally to guide action. The identification of black rage,
psychological feelings of impotence, inability to impact the
''system" except in violence, appear to be general problems facing
those responsible for management in the public arena. These were
approached in this Action Research effort through the mechanism of
a participative planning panel.
3. The relationship of information availability and flow to a
problem-solving effort are important. Additionally, the participa-
tive planning process led-to a shift in attitude, which appears to
; v • . . . . v •• • •
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be a controlling factor in the perception and use of communicated
data. Thus, the concept of meta-communication, or attention to the
forces which govern communication, is considered to be of the utmost
importance.
NASA MANAGEMENT TECHNOLOGY
NASA Planning Panel
The NASA Planning Panel provided a process for participative
planning of the DeLaWarr Social Services Center. Due to the tur-
bulent environment, the relevant aspects of the problem had to
be defined before beginning to approach'solutions. The planning
panel established in DeLaWarr brought together those closest to
the problem—representatives of the needs (the community) and
resources (government and private social service agencies)—in a
long-term cooperative problem-solving effort. The planning panel
also provided a base for attack on other problems, such as black
identity and competence, group to group relationships (both
black-white and citizen-bureaucrat), and provided a non-violent
means for having the governmental system respond to community
needs.
Additionally, in response to a shooting crisis, a one-dayi
workshop in Belvedere successfully telescoped the long-term DeLaWarr
process.
ACHIEVEMENTS IN NEW .CASTLE COUNTY ;'
1. DeLaWarr Social Services Facility
Groundbreaking ceremonies for the DeLaWarr Community, Center
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• . • "i .
were held on Saturday, October 14, 1972. They were attended by the
. i
Governor of Delaware, and senior federal officials from the Depart-
ment of Health, Education and Welfare, as well as representatives
from State and County Government. This social service facility,
with its broad definition of social and health (as contrasted with
medical) services, together with the planning process which brought
together needs and resources in a cooperative effort, were heralded
on the groundbreaking occasion as a "prototype" for a newly
conceived federal program for establishing federal centers for the
advancement of human potential.
2. Establishment of Planning Panel
The Ad Hoc Committee had provided an excellent mechanism for
channeling devisive picketing into constructive problem-solving
efforts, and developing commitment towards the superordinate goal
of social services for the area. Additionally, it provided a
• • " ' _ ' . - . / ' . , . -
means by which specific needs, problems, and priorities within
a turbulent community could be sensed so that an appropriate
action program could be designed. The thrust of the Ad Hoc
Committee was continued beyond its original charter by using its
members as the basis for a citizen's Advisory Board to oversee
the completed Social Services Center and its programs. Addi-
tionally, plans were made to involve citizens from contiguous
communities'in an effort to ensure the Center would be responsive
to the needs of the total area, and to involve these additional
communities in superordinate goal statement and.development.
3. Communications and Coordination
!•: . j . •
Participation in the planning process enabled increased
communications and coordination of various levels of government and
private effort towards both the DeLaWarr and Belvedere areas. Once
established, the integration of efforts was continued, both for-
mally and informally (and subsequently was expanded to other
problems of joint interest as diverse as dance theatre for teens,
increasing the tax base, and "turn in a pusher" programs).
Additionally, the need to enhance communications and coordina-
tion within the County Government resulted in the establishment of
an interdepartmental planning group which is responsible for internal
coordination of departments and linkage with outside organizations
as needed fpr specific projects and problems.
4. Federation of Associations in Belvedere '
The need for a federation of the various organizations, as
established during the workshop, was institutionalized. Each
organization in the Belvedere area has representation within the
Federation. . The Federation serves as the mechanism within the
community for identifying problems and establishing priorities,
which are then pursued with government or other resources as
appropriate. ;.
A NOTE OF CAUTION
It is .necessary to interject a note of caution for the reader
who may desire to apply NASA techniques in other.problem areas:
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1. Specific Action Programs are extremely situational in
I
nature. The process of analysis (as asserted in this paper) is
of key importance in designing an action program. The current
program could not have been designed adequately without an under-
standing of the philosophy behind the technology selected.
2. The current program was in response to urban problems with.
clearly stated goals. Although it is hypothesized that elements of
the present program may be applicable to problem areas of bargaining
and negotiation, no claim can be extended without additional
research. • :
3. The current program was performed in a unique social system.
There is no' statistical comparison available. The concept of.,
e qui-finality suggests that precise cause and effect relationships
may be difficult to determine. Quite obviously, there is the need
for further research in understanding management w^ithin turbulent
environments, the role of buffering, and investigation into appro-
priate research methodologies. . . - ' " •
4. This research associate was given responsibility for
social change within the system under analysis. Thus, the
emphasis centered primarily on that responsibility. Interplay
between clinical responsibility and scientific analysis require
close attention. '
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MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING.
BETWEEN
DREXEL INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
AND THE
NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION
The Drexel Institute of Technology and the National Aeronautics and
Space Administration are of the opinion that future development in
the fields of aeronautics and space technology will require improved
understanding of large scale systems technology and management. We
agree that it is in the national interest to develop greater com-
petency in this field through expanded graduate education and
research. This Memorandum of Understanding sets forth our mutual
understanding and the guidelines that will govern our joint efforts
to achieve this objective.
In expanding and developing this nation's scientific and technologi-
cal capability to meet new requirements and new opportunities in
aeronautics and space, the National Aeronautics
 :and Space Administra-
tion has recognized a continuing need for persons who can work with
the new and expanding dimensions of science and
 ;technology and who
understand the broad administrative and management implications of
the large-scale programs carried out by NASA. Tlie success of future
programs in aeronautics and space as well as in other areas of public
concern which can use the management methods and systems developed is
dependent upon the education and training of such individuals.
'"'.''( ' ' . . . . . . ' • - •
Further, it is believed that NASA's organizationJand management
experience over the past decade suggests that"similar techniques
might be used to realize other national goals of a. large-scale and
technology-based nature. We believe it is in the national interest
to investigate these management practices and the relevant tech-
nology, to study possible transfers of this experience to other
national problems, to increase research in the relevant systems
management-related disciplines, and then to evaluate current gradu-
ate school knowledge in the light of the knowledge gained.
We believe that the facilities and managerial staff of the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration offer many elements that may
be thought(df as a research laboratory to give investigators the
opportunity to gain the data and experience necessary to form more
knowledgeable judgments on the items cited above;; Consequently,
it is a basis of this Memorandum of Understanding, that the National
Aeronautics, and Space Administration will open appropriate elements
of its installations and activities and make appropriate members
of its staff available to faculty and graduate.investigators
selected bjt the Drexel Institute of Technology.
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We believe such NASA support and cooperation in research-oriented
technology and administrative activity, in parallel with an
energetic effort by the Drexel Institute of Technology to expand
its research activity along with the strengthening of faculty and
curriculum,' can provide a combination of circumstances that will
help meet the need for broader guaged and more effective adminis-
trators o£ research and development efforts.
Therefore, the Drexel Institute of Technology and the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration agree to establish a pilot
program in graduate education and research reflecting a multi-
disciplinary .approach to administration, management and the trans-
fer of relevant technology. In recognition of their mutual
obligations concerning the development and growth of this program,
our two institutions agree to provide reciprocal support, advice
and assistance.
The Drexel Institute of Technology will, within budgetary con-,
straints:
1. Offer a. curriculum leading to a doctoral degree in public
administration or related management disciplines that includes
consideration of the elements and best practice in the management
of science and technology programs and prepares students for
careers either as scholars or administrators of public programs
involving the interaction of science, technology, and management.
2. Endeavor, to develop increased interest, competence, and know-
ledge in the graduate faculty and to encourage research in the
rapidly advancing areas related to large-scale systems technology
and public administration. M
f
3. Through intensive study and evaluation, identify those elements
in NASA's technology, organization, and management which may be
transferred to other large-scale national problems.
4. Continually update curriculum and methods of instruction to
assure that emphasis is placed on an early utilization of research
results and an effort is made to relate these to the real world
problems administrators face in programs such as those carried on
by NASA and other public agencies.
5. Endeavor: to develop ways and means to stimulate; use of the
installations*, activities and staff made available,by the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration, its associate, contractors, or
other governmental agencies by appropriate senior faculty and
doctoral students working under their direction for, systematic
field research, analysis, and observation. 'r-
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6. Encourage the inclusion of pertinent research material in the
appropriate curricula of other Drexel schools and departments such
as business;,1 engineering, and the health professions.
7. Interrelate this program with other space research and
educational endeavors at the Drexel Institute of Technology.
8. Observe; pre-publication courtesies with respect to research
findings permitting comment by appropriate NASA officials, which
comment shall not be binding on the Institute. '
9. Report semi-annually on the progress and development of the
program to the National Aeronautics and Space Administration.
The National,Aeronautics and Space Administration will, within the
constraints of its operating budget:
1. Make available appropriate elements of its activities, facili-
ties, and staff in the Washington Headquarters, field centers, and
contractors' plants for use by investigators conducting research
in this program.
2. Provide support to the Drexel Institute of Technology for
carrying out, its obligations noted in the above paragraph.
3. Recognize the right of the Institute and its faculty to publish
research findings in any appropriate journal or other publication
of its choice.
4. Monitor, progress of the program in order to assure progress
toward stated goals for both parties, and in order to determine the
extent to which the program should be continued beyond the initial
finding.
It is the purpose of both parties of the Memorandum of Understand-
ing to so operate under it, that activities under it, will provide
an enrichment of curriculum and strengthening of the faculty- in a
manner fully consistent with the goals, traditions,, objectives,
plans for development, prerogative, or freedoms of Drexel Institute
of Technology. .
; Drexel Institute of Technology
Date 11 Aug 69 /s/ Wm. Haeerty
: : William W. Hagerty, President
c. National Aeronautics and Space
Administration
Date 4? Aug 69 /s/ T. R. Paine-.
• ! - • ' . ' • Thomas 0. Paine^  Administrator
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WORKING PAPER ON ACTION-RESEARCH FOR NASA/DREXEL GRANT*
The NASA-Drexel Ph.D. Grant is based upon a number'of assumptions.
First, NASA has developed valid management technology in the pro-
cess of achieving its organizational objectives. Secondly, that
NASA's Management Technology, though honed and refined in clearly
defineable terms for outer space objectives, is applicable for the
management of large-scale and socio-technical urban problems.
Thirdly, that the NASA-Drexel research associates and investigators
will attempt to test out the transfer of NASA's Management Tech-
nology to urban problems. Finally, such a transfer to any urban
client system must, of necessity, involve an Action Research
Methodologyi;
Doctor Paine, Chief Administrator of NASA, has described NASA as a
"digital" social system where the objectives were clearly define-
able and the major problems were scientific. But Doctor Paine also
described Durban systems as "Darwinian" or evolutionary where; many
human factors impacted and could not be as controlled as in a
"digital" system. Therefore, the problem of achieving a resolution
of critical urban problems is fraught with social and political
uncertainty and demands a different management and research cap-'.
ability! - .'• • • • '-. '•'•"'.;': " .';'. .'.•;
the NASA Research Associates have identified NASA's planning pro-
cess, configuration management, information systems, and simula-
tion as genericaily invaluable and applicable to some urban prob-
lems. Therefore,jan urban social system should be found where
these specific management technologies could be; tested out for
their transferability and resolution to critical urban problems.
In order to insure the successful accomplishment of this transfer
the client or urban environment in which the NASA Team would work
must of necessity have problems which match the possibility of
transferring these management technologies. Sanction must be
obtained from the highest governing unit in order to have authority
to work within a particular system on a particular urban problem.
The key aspects of the model are the development of diagnostic
skills, data; gathering, feedback to the client group, data
discussion and work by the client group, action planning, and
action. Naturally this is a cyclical process involving the
manager and those with whom he collaborates in studying the
*NASA Grant, Third Semi-Annual Progress Report, June 30, 1970,
Section 2.4.1.
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existing situation, state, or problem. But managers are not only
interested in understanding what is but also in what should be the
preferred state. The question then becomes how to reach that
objective through what kind of alternative interventions or
strategies.
Action Research should be considered the science of design where
courses of design or action are aimed at changing existing
situations into preferred ones. In the example of the NASA Research
Associates, they will be dealing with live,, critical problems in a
complex urban setting, attempting to design actions or interventions
to correct or .change situations or people to a more preferred state
of function in accord with the goals of the responsible authorities.
The Action Research Design and methodologies would serve as
strategies for the Research Associates in Public Administration.
The change problems in real urban situations to which they will .
address themselves will serve as the laboratory where they will
learn and test out their expertise. The dissertations will be
scholarly descriptions of their analysis, designs, interventions,
and evaluations of their efforts to change an existing situation
into a preferred one. There will be developed a methodological
framework .and a theoretical base in order to provide a systematic
way to understand and keep track of the impacts of the significant
variables.
However, action research is just not an attempt to enter a
particular client system as an expert, apply a known body of
knowledge or skill, and exit. It is rather the effort to assist
those within a particular system to develop the skill and knowledge
to manage their system or problems oh their own with greater
expertise. Being multi-disciplinary in their training, the" NASA
Research Associates will make every effort to assist those within
the particular client system to be responsible for changing and
managing their own system in a more professional manner.
The Action Research methodology will proceed in the following
manner:
1. Efforts will be made to gain initial entry to a particular
urban system by June or September 1970. Sanction, and negotiation
of terms of the relationships should be agreed upon before final
entry.
2. Once initial entry is agreed upon, a period of two to three
months should be utilized to study that particular client system
in order to more fully understand how it functions and disfunctions.
Furthermore, this initial explanation and orientation period should
serve as a period of gaining wider acceptance and identification
with that system. Finally, problem identification and definition
would be accomplished in this exploration period. -
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3. Once problems are identified and agreement is .negotiated with
the client system, then each problem area will be studied as to
strategies, designs or methods to effect change or influence to a
preferred state. Alternative methods will be considered for each
problem. Every effort will be made to consider the behavioral
and organizational consequence of every intervention so as not to
upset the homeostasis of that system.
A. Concurrent with the action research, evaluation of the
particular projects will be made by the Associate Investigators, .
and the organizational preceptors. When appropriate, some of the
preceptors may serve as adjunct professors. All of these will,
serve as process observers of the action research and provide
consultative assistance.
5. Finally, upon successful accomplishment of the action research,
a descriptive dissertation will be presented with hypothesis,
action steps, and consequences or results, with generalizations
drawn from the research. Successful action research should produce
three basic outcomes: (1) the achievement of the planned change,
(2) new knowledge, and (3) a manager of increasing professional
competence.
The problem to which the NASA Research Associates will address
themselves, must be doable within a time span of eighteen months, in
order to terminate the action-research and accomplish the objectives
of the Ph.D. .degree. Finally, the client system in which the NASA
Research Associates will function must provide a responsible
official from within the system who will serve as a preceptor for
the NASA Research Associates as they study and assist in resolu-
tion of particular problems.
This NASA-Drexel Action Research can be considered then as manage-
ment problem-solving in complex urban social systems, where the
action focuses not only on observing, but on the effective change,
or transfer, of management technologies to the resolution of urban
problems. Each Research Associate will call upon his increasing
knowledge in.;technology, management science, behavioral science
and public administration in the resolution of the particular
problem, and he must also perform professionally as a change agent
in order to achieve1; Ms Ph.D. ...
Action Research Definition and Theory,
A major strategy and focus in urban government management will be
to the action research model. Behavioral scientists involved in
organizational development and change are convinced that this
model is'most valid for learning in such a rapidly changing society
as we have created. This model has been described by "William Fotte
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Whyte as "a continuous fathering and analysis of human relatioua
research data and the feeding of the findings into the organization
in such a manner as to change behavior." The following figure
summarizes some of the essential phases of the action research
model.
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MODEL BUILDING
BACKGROUND
After intensive preparation and analysis of NASA Management,
the decision was made to go ahead with the plans to test the
applicability of the NASA techniques through involvement within a
particular urban system. The sociological technique of participant-
i ' - . ' . . / - -
observed would be utilized, with the added dimension that the
research associate would take management responsibility within the
system.
Prior to selection of an urban system for implementation, an
Action Research Model was articulated.
The question still remained: are these techniques of NASA
applicable within an urban setting? In whole? In part?
In response to that anxiety, this researcher Investigated two
additional models of scientific progress:
The first—the model of paradigm application and advancement—
the model of scientific method (or the model of "strong inference").*
The second—the model of paradigm failure—the model of
scientific revolution (the Kuhn model).*
^Referenced below.
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MODEL OF SCIENTIFIC METHOD
The scientific method consists of:
. . .systematic application ... of the following steps
to every problem in science formally and explicitly and
regularly:
1. Devising alternative hypotheses;
2. Devising a crucial experiment (or several of them),
with alternative possible outcomes, each of which
will, as nearly as possible, exclude one or more of
the hypotheses;
3. Carrying out the experiment so as to get a clean
result; .
1'. Recycling the procedure, making subhypotheses or
sequential hypotheses to refine the possibilities
that remain, and so on.^
Platt continues with the problems involved in- the systematic
approach to hew areas:
On any new problem, of course, inductive inference is
not as simple and certain as deduction, because it
involves reaching out into the unknown. Steps 1 and
2 require intellectual inventions, which must.,be
cleverly chosen so that hypothesis, experiment, outcome,
and exclusion will be related in a rigorous syllogism;
and the question of how to generate such inventions is
one which has been extensively discussed elsewhere.
What the formal scheme reminds us to-do is to try to ,
make these inventions, to take the next step, to pro-'
ceed to the next fork, without dawdling or getting
tied up .in irrelevancies.2
It is this system which provides the system for the classic
scientific approach.
However, as Thomas Kuhn has documented, something quite
different from the "systematic application . . . (of the) steps
formally and explicitly and regularly" happens in scientific
revolution. ...
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THE MODEL OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTION
The Kuhn Model
Thomas Kuhn, in his analysis of the structure of scientific
revolutions, makes the distinction between "Normal Science . . .
the further articulation and specification under new or more
3
stringent conditions (of a paradigm)" and "Crisis Science .
paradigm change and the emergence of a novel theory (after a) . .
4pronounced failure in the normal problem solving activity."
Both Normal and Crisis Science use the techniques of "strong
inference" described above. But, while normal science concerns
itself with the articulation of a paradigm, Crisis Science begins
with the blurring of a paradigm. Paradigm change starts with
unresolved anamoly generating paradigm failure.
The difference can be diagrammed:
Normal .Science Crisis Science j
Paradigm Paradigm \
Alternate Hypothesis Alternate Hypothesis
T t
Experiment Experiment
• '-•,>; | . f :•;..
Results Results
*
:
:U :!A
New Experiment, etc. Crisis
Kuhn' points toward the change in behavior exhibited by
scientists in crisis situations: they turn to "philosophical
analyses as a device for unlocking the riddles in their field."
1-4;
Confronted with anomaly or with crisis, scientists take
a different attitude toward existing paradigms, and the
nature of their research changes accordingly,-. The
proliferation of competing articulations, the willing-
news to try anything, the expression of explicit dis-
content, the recourse to philosophy and to debate over
fundamentals, all these are symptoms of a transition
from normal to extraordinary research.^
The-process of scientific revolution appears to be analogous
to research into the philosophy of creativity. That is, in contrast
to the continued progression of accomplishment, there is activity
leading nowhere or to failure.
The:steps in the creative process:
1. Sustained effort.
2. Disillusionment.
3. Illumination or Insight (usually the same data-set, but
put in a new way—which may have been blocked by the
old paradigm). ' .
A. Verification. *,
C. E. M. Joad explores the historical perspective of this
creative phenomenon.
Modern psychological theory supports the Platonic
account of the aesthetic process, more particularly in
respect of its recognition of two distinct stages, the
first a stage of sustained intellectual effort, the
second an ensuing flash of intuitive apprehension,
which are very similar to those affirmed in the
Symposium and the Republic. A brief account of modern
psychological work on the subject may serve a useful
purpose in developing the Platonic view.
• .. ' i
In a well-known work, The Art of Thought, Professor
Graham,Wallas summarized the information which modern
psychology has obtained with regard to the processes
involved in the birth of new ideas in the world of
thought and original inspiration in that of art. His
.14'
summary goes beyond that of Plato's account in that
it distinguishes four stages in the process which
leads to the making of a new generalization,' the
discovery of a new formula, the devising of a new
invention or the conception of a new work of-art.
The .first is that of Preparation, during which a
particular problem is investigated in all directions;
the second, that of Incubation, during which no
conscious thinking is done in connection with the
problem or work of art with which the creative
thinker or artist is concerned; the third, consisting
of the "happy idea," together with psychological
events accompanying that appearance, is called
illumination; and fourth, embodying the working
our and application of the idea in thought or the
execution of the work of art, Vertification.
Particular stress is laid upon the; importance of
Preparation as a preliminary to Illumination.
Professor Wallas speaks of.the many men of genius who
have done their best work after a period of idleness.
But the period of idleness must itself be preceded
by a spell of hard thinking, during which the. intellect
is working at full pressure. To adopt the language
of modern psychology, we may say that consciousness
during'the Preparation stage propounds a problem,
collects the relevant data and explores different
avenues for a possible solution. A period of rest
ensues during which the problem and relevant data
are transferred to the unconscious. That the
unconscious may work effectively consciousness must,
so far/as possible, be unoccupied. The solution is
worked out by the unconscious, and appears in due course
in consciousness as the "happy idea" of the scientist
and the inspiration of the artist.
The conclusion bears out Platt's hint in the Symposium.
Wallas'like Plato stresses the fact that the "happy
idea" which succeeds the period of hard thinking is
of an entirely different order from the thinking itself.
It outruns the thinking, and, although it is led up to,
is far from being necessitated by it. The mind, in
other words, makes a definite jump, and it is for this
reason that in the sphere of science a subsequent process
of "vertification" is necessary.'7
 : •
CONCLUSIONS
Action Research provides the model for intervention into an
:
 • ' ! • ' ' ' : ' •
urban system to meet problems of that system. And, in doing so,
•''' • ' . " '
 r
utilizes paradigms of management learned from NASA.
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Prior to entry into the urban system, it is unknown whether
solutions will lie in paradigm application or paradigm change.
Models for each were stated. It also appears that Scientific
Revolution is found in a Turbulent Environment, and Scientific
Inference in less complex environments, an area for further
j
research. .
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CRITERIA FOR SELECTION OF ACTION RESEARCH PROJECT
for
Drexel University - NASA Team
March 2, 1970
Action-research is the vital link in the testing of the
transferability of NASA's technology to solving urban problems.
The selection of the appropriate location and the related pro-
ject or projects is therefore crucial.
, The basic criteria for the selection are as follows:
1. The invitation should be approved by the highest governing
unit to which the project is related.
2. The inviting unit should have adequate resources (legitimate
authority, financial resources or political influence) to
carry out the project.
3. The inviting group should be able to provide or arrange for
adequate financial resources to meet the local expenses
involved in the action-research.
4. The action-research should focus upon the transfer of the
planning-configuration management process, information
management and simulation.
• -, ••'• t •, ,• -
5. There should be a reasonable chance of success in achieving
the goals of the project.
6. The length of time for the action-research should not
exceed 15-18 months depending on the starting date and
should be, completed by January, 1972, at the latest.
7. Preferably, the Research Associates should be able to
function as a team of professionals in relation to the
participants in a particular project.
8. ' Within the action-research the Research Associate shall be
responsible for carrying out and reporting upon an identi-
fiable aspect of that research. The resulting thesis based
upon this research shall fulfill the academic requirements
of Drexe* University.
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9. The project should have local participants.with the competence
and authority to see the project through to its completion.
10. The project should be of such scope as to involve the
coordination of the efforts, resources, and approval of
several governmental agencies and/or private agencies.
11. The project should be relevant to a major social issue.
12. The appropriate governmental authorities should approve in
. principal the planning of ..the particular project.
13. The planning- for the particular project should include
representatives of the persons or group directly affected
by the project.
14. The appropriate NASA authorities should be in agreement
about the action-research.
15. The location of the action-research should be within a
reasonable commuting distance of an hour or less from Drexel.
16. The host agency or agencies should appoint a preceptor from
within their organization to whom the NASA Research
Associates can report, test out hypotheses, and receive
feedback. - ;
APPENDIX E
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THE DE LA WARR AREA*
Of aJ 1 the suburban school districts, within the immediate
vicinity of Wilmington, I would assign the highest priority to
the De La Warr School District in terms of participation in the
local anti-poverty program. To validate this observation, it is
important to discuss the De La Warr districts in the larger con-
text of metropolitan Delaware.
In preparing its report on the. demographic and socio-economic
characteristics of the metropolitan area, the research staff on
the Community Services Council subdivided the populous northern
section of New Castle County into six metropolitan districts.
Wilmington city is treated as a separate district; the Brandywine
Metropolitan District is coincident with the Brandywine Hundred,
the Alex I. Dupont District is roughly synonomous with the area
served by the school district of the same name; the Newark
Metropolitan Special School District; the Southwest Metropolitan
District combines the service areas of the Conrad High School
and Dickinson High School; and the. New Castle Metropolitan District,
which contains in its northern portion the De La Warr School District,
is coincident, with the boundaries of New Castle Hundred.
''••Summary of remarks presented to representatives of the De La
Warr School District by Lawrence Schein, Research Director of the
Community Service Council of Delaware, on February 2, 1965.
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In a comparative analysis,, our attention is obviously on the
New Cattle Melrppolitan District which had in 1960 a youthful,
highly fertile population and the. largest family sine of they six
metropolitan districts of northern Delaware. Compared to thb
other suburban .districts, the New Castle area has the loxjest
average family income and the highest rates of j^verty__and .
unemployment; it was the only suburban area to contain a
substantial negro population. Compared to all metropolitan
districts in northern Delaware, including the city of Wilmington^
the New'Castle District had proportionately the smallest: white
JiHiEhfr^i the fevjest adults with college training and the fewest^
families in the highest income brackets.
In the .terminology of economists and sociologists, the
Brandywine and .Alex I. DuPont districts display traits which have
become identified with the "affluent society." The Newark and
Southwest districts with their nearly equal division between, white
collar and blue collar workers may be termed middlfe income or
middle class areas. Taken together, the Wilmington and New Castle
districts—the latter inclusive of the De La Warr area—present a
very different socio-economic profile. Essentially these two.
districts show a high frequency of low income and lower middle
income neighborhoods; the area could be described as working class
in nature with respect to both its white and nonwhite inhabitants.
In one sense, the Now Castle district represents an -exf-ension of
many of the working class and lower income characteristics found '
in-the city of Wilmington and this is particularly true of the
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northern segment of the Naw_Castle I'i
£I!lk£S^ s Jill? «y:J?iL sowed _by__the_ Do La Warr Hi s_t_r_l_cL_.
The Do. Lu Wan: District, as of. the last dcmvi.a.1. censur;, con-
tained a popu.laf.ion of .17 ,687 persons inclusive of approximately
1500 patients at the Delaware State Hospital. Slightly over one-
fifth of the De La Warr population was Negro; This ratio closely
reserab3.es that obtained in the city of Wilmington. Of the Le La
V/arr districts Negro population of 3800 persons, 88% were concen-
trated in Tracts ISA an d 1 55 -• - the Dual e ith_,_ Hillside .,^ akmont_>
Eden Park, Sj.monds Garden_s_^and_jJgllgv/ay Terrace sections .
Median age of population in the school district was slightly
less than 27 years. Whites, on the average, were 27 years of
age and Negroes averaged about 25-1/2 years. The minimum age
differential between Negro and White in the De La Warr district
stands in sharp contrast to Wilmington where a very much older
white population co-exists with an extremely youthful Negro
population. In the De La Warr district median age would be even
younger where Che population at the Delaware State Hospital
excluded from the statistical base. For example, upon elimination
of the female institutionalised population in Tract 153, the
median age for women in the district is but 23 years; white women
show a median age of 24 years and nonwhite women averaged 20-1/2
years of: age.
Fertility in the De. La Warr district is considerably above
average for the county with the anomaly that the white fertility
is higher than the Negro fertility. This c?.n be seen by examination
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of fertility ratios for 1960, that is, the number of children
under 5 years of age per 1000 women in the child bearing years 15
through 44. Exclusion of the female institutionalized population
from the base for calculation yields a white fertility ratio of
704 children under 5 years per 3.000 women in the child bearing
years compared to a Negro fertility ratio of 632. In the city of
Wilmington, the Negro fertility was 707. Since the Negro De La
Warr population is slightly younger than Wilmington's Nagro popula- .
tion but demonstrates a lower fertility ratio, it is suggested that
this differential fertility may indicate a trend to smaller
families among middle income families living in the Oakmont area
of Tract 154••'.:-, It should also be noted that the white fertility,
ratio in the DC La Warr district is of. the same high order of
magnitude as.that demonstrated by Negro inhabitants in Wilmington.
Family size in the Do. La Warr district is subsequently relatively
high—an average of slightly over 4 persons per primary family
unit.
In speaking of family characteristics, it "is well to point
to the extent, of family disorganization within the district as
measured by the proportion of youngsters not living in complete
families. In the De La Warr district 950 children under 18 years
of age or 135 of the area's youthful population did not live with
both parents in 1960. This rate for children living in broken
or incomplete families is somc-.-.'hat higher than for other suburban
metropolitan districts although considerably lower than the rate
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which was obtained in the city of Wilmington. In s ub urban __Np.w_
Ca>'U:3.o Cc>unLy_<ii5; 'a whole, S-.V-'^  <'* .^ L^ VVyOl..:?!^ ^^ ^^
uon-relnt ives pl^ ir^ inr.titiiti.c^ na^  arrangements. In Tract ^65,
closg_to one in every four youngsters were not living in a
completed family _uui_t_.
With respect to migration into the area, it is noteworthy
that the proportion of Southerners in the De La Warr district is
greatly higher than for most other sections of the northern county.
Of 1950 persons coming into the De La Warr section from southern
states. There is also a tendency for De La Warr district to draw
proportionately more city people than is the case for other suhurban
areas: 3.5% of the district's I960 population reported living in
Wilmington 5 years earlier.
The median family income in the De La Warr district was
$5954 in 1959 as reported in the 1960 census. This figure stands
in contrast to median family incomes of $8900 in the Brandywine
district:, $10,000 in the Alex I. Dupont district, $7100 in Newark
and Southwest Districts and closely parallels- Wilmington1 s average
family .income of $5600. Since the average family income in the
New Castle district as a whole was $6300, this means that these
families living in the area served by New Castle. Special School
District to the south of the De La Warr district were living in
somewhat more advantaged economic circumstances. Of De La Warr ' s
_^ S2Ji_jTa^ i.l-!c^  , 4_05 or _.l_0-l/2% lived in poverty according to current
£0imnen definitions , that 'is, with incone. of 'less than '$3000
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j^Ef^
lJ-^  jlc A^^ ''lA Ifo0cess' then 819 ^De^ La
Wayr families or 'nearly one 'of every five would JLiye^ in ecojrK)inic_
deprivation.. In the district, wealth and poverty are very evenly
•. . |.
balanced: 11% of families had incomes in excess of $10,000..
Of the 405:families earning annual incomes of less than | :
$3000 or 303 or fully three-fourths, were concentrated in the
three Northern tracts of the districts; 153, 154, and 155. [At
" "~- *"-"--•—' " _ ' - 1 ' "••- ' *--' -
1
— •" ' ""*" ' I
least one-third of these low income families were Negro. The 405
low income families in the district represented one of every ten
low income families in suburban New Castle County in 1960.
Only one-third of the De La Warr district's employed workers
were in white collar capacities compared to slightly over half
of all workers in the county as a whole who were, engaged in .
professional,, technical, managerial, sales and clerical employment.
In the county, the single largest occupational group consisted of
professionals and technicians: 17-1/2% of all employed workers.
In the De La Warr district, on the other hand, the single largest
group was composed of operatives of semi-skilled workers. One- .
fourth of all employed workers were assemblers, filers, grinders,
polishers, guards, furnacemen, welders, apprentices and the like.
Nearly half of all workers were unskilled .or semi-skilled, working
laborers, operatives, domestics and service workers. The male .
employee rate in the De La Warr district in 1960 was about V%—
considerably higher than in all other areas with the exception
of Wilmington.
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Muaatioriar.l_y , _the__ I^ JLaJWa rr_ il-'.-lL1:.!:.1!
- - °
 11
-
1
 adult'5 » * • e .•-.»
of .age_ o_r _oVer_ hacT not _^ j^ e^ h^ h_jsciiool^ 4^05 had not completed
ninth grade ; -9Jlli_8^ 'J^ l^^ ^^ _^ ast__brv^  year of college J;rjajming.
If Is significant to note that, in the Be La Warr district, the
public is the primary form of educationa.1. experience; in 1960 85%
"of all children of school age. in the district were, enrolled in
public schools compared for example, to about two-thirds of school
children in Wilmington similarly enrolled.
With respect to housing characteristics the De La Warr district
shows an exceptionally high home ownership rate: 85% of all
housing were owner occupied. Of the districts 4324 housing units,
units in the amount of 11% were in deteriorating or dilapidated .
condition. Of all the substandard units in the De La Warr area,
347 or 71% were, located in the. northern tier on Tracts.
Both the foregoing remarks as well as the data .presented in
the attached tables show a reasonably well defined socio-economic
^.f f eiien_t.iaj.-._g'h^ ai_ned_ between the northern and southern sections
°^ __
t:Jlc_,.fie La 1'arr district. The southern tier of tracts show a
hi gher proper t ion of _white___collar workers, greater adult educa-
j^ ional attainment, higher family income, and generally less
severe problems of sul^ stjtjjdar^ d housing when compared with .the
L^}'-^  ^.^ L^-lilfi^ JL5 !^1 .^?^ -]?^ 1^^ '^  adjoin the JW Iminjt on_ci t y
line .
APPENDIX F
lf.1
STAR POWEK
R. GARRY SHIRTS
This is a game in which a low mobility three-tiered society is
hxid.lt through the distribution of x^ealth in the form of chips. Par-
ticipants have a chance to progress from one level of society to
another by acquiring wealth through trading with other participants.
Oncf. the society is established, the group with the most wealth is
given the right to make the rules for the game. They generally make
rules which the other groups consider to be unfair, fascistic and
racist.. A revolt against the rules and the rule-makers generally
ensues. When this occurs the game is ended. The game, is useful for
raising questions about the uses of power in a competitive society.
Preparing for the Game
Dividing the.Participants and Assigning Chips
The participants are divided into three approximately equal
groups named: squares, circles and triangles. Each person wears a
symbol representing his group, i.e., the squares wear a square
symbol, the circles a circular symbol and the triangles a triangular
symbol.
Each participant is given five chips. Each square receives
one gold chip, one. green chip and the. remaining three randomly
selected from the colors red, white and blue. Each circle is given
one. green chip and the remaining four selected from the colors
red, white and blue. The triangles are given a random assortment
of red, white and blue chips. The only exception to this distri-
bution is that one circle and one triangle receive the same
distribution as the squares, i.e., one gold, one green and a
random assortment of red, white and blue.
I
Determining tho Chips Required for a Game
The TOTAL number of chips required equals:
5X number of participants
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red chip, hie score would equal 4 x 5 (for the blue chips)
plus ]5 (for the red chip) plus 1.0 points for distribution
of the saw0 color for a total of 45 points. Three reds
and tvo blues would equal 45 + 5 + 10 or 60 points. Five
reds: 75 + 20 or 95 points.
3. Distribute the chips as outlined previously to the squares,
circles and triangles.
4~ Explain the following ru3.es of bargaining.
a. .They have ten minutes to improve their scores.
b. They improve their scores by trading advantageously
with other squares, circles and triangles.
c. Persons must be holding hands to effect a trade.
d. Only one for one trades are legal. Two for one or
any other combinations are illegal.
e. Once participants touch the hand of another participant'
a chip of unequal value or color must be traded. If a
couple cannot consxumnate a trade they may have to hold
hands for the entire ten minute trading session.
f. There is no talking unless hands are touching. This
Rulc_Sho uld Be S t r i c 11 yj En f or c e d. ,:
g. Persons with folded arms do not have to trade with
other persons.
h. • All chips should be hidden. This Rule Shguld Be .
Strictly Enforced. . '. '
i. Do not reveal that .the squares are given chips of a
higher, value than the circles or triangles. ,
j. Any other rules that you deem appropriate.
. Start the Trading Session , .'
1. After the rules have been explained, start the trading
session. Tell them it will last 10 minutes.
?,. During the. trading session, jyour assistant should be
putting each .participant's initials on the blackboard.. -
3. After;10 minutes of trading session, have :each group
return to their circle of chairs.
4. Have the participants compute their scores for the trading
sessioii, record them on their score sheet and hand the score sheet
to your assistant.
5. Have your assistant record the scores on the blackboard
opposite the person's initials. (The initials and their scores
can be put on by the participants themselves if an assistant is not
available.) ' •
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The number of GOLD chips required equals:
Tbe number of. squares plus 2
The uuiubo.r ol GlUiM chips required equals:
The number of squares plus the. number of clients plus 1.
The number oi: RED, WHITE c-nJ WAJE chips required equals:
5X number of part.icipauLs minus the total number of green
and gold chips required. There should be. about avi equal
ni.ur.be3; of red, white and blue chips.
Example: Suppose you have 34 people and divide them info
12"squares, 12 circles and 10 triangles. The total number
of chips required equals: 5 x 34 or 170. The total number
of GOLD chips required equals: 12 (the number of squares)
plus 2 or 14. The total number of GREF.N chips required
equals: 12(tho. number of squares) plus • 12 (the. number of
circles) plus 1 or 25. The total number of RED, "WHITE,
and BLUE chips required equals: 170 - (1.4 plus 25) or
131 which means about 44 of each color.
Explaining the Rules .
1. Tell Lhe.-partic.lpT.nts that this is a game th.at involves
trading and bargaining and that the three, persons v:; t;h the highest
scores will be declared the winner.)'. They will probably aslc lati-
in the game, if there is going to be a group winner'. The answer is:
("The three individuals with the highest scores will be declared
the winners.") Do not tell them that a group is going to be given
the right to make the rules for the game.
2. Explain the following scoring system to the participants:
Every gold chip is worth 80 points
Every green chip is worth 25 points
Every red chip.is worth 15 points
Every white chip is worth 10 points
Every blue chip is worth 5 points
I
Additional points are given if a person is able to get
several points of the same color.
Five chips of the same color are worth 20 points
Four chips of the same color are worth 10 points
Three chips of the same color are worth 5 points
No: extra points given for tv;o chips of the same color
Example: A person's total score if he had 5 gold chips
would be. 250 plus 20 for 5 chips of the same color for a
total of-270 points. If he had four blue chips and one
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6. Explain the rules for the bonus points session. The rules
are: .
a. Hold up a bonus chip (a double chip) and tell them
that this is a bonus point chip.
b. Give each group three chips.
c. . Tell them that each ch.ip is worth 20 points.
d. Their task during the bonus session is to distribute
the bonus chips to members of their group.
e. The chips must be distributed in units of 20 or more,
that is, one person might receive all 3 bonus chips and
60 points or 3 people could not receive 10 points each.
f. .They have five minutes to distribute the bonus chips.
If the groups have not distributed the chips at the end
of the five minutes, the points will be taken back by
the director and no one will receive them. •;'.
g. The decision regarding the distribution of chips must be
; unanimous vote. .
h. Participants can eliminate people from their group by a
majority vote. (Eliminated people can form anothe.r
group.) They should be a triangle group.
7. Answer any questions.
8. Start the bonus chip bargaining session.
9. After about five or ten minutes, end the.bonus chip
bargaining session. . . ' . • - . '
10. Have those people who receive bonus points record, them on
the blackboard opposite their initials.
11.. Put .those people with the highest total scores in the
square groups. If there is a circle or a triangle who has
a" higher score than a square, have them trade groups. Any
changes should be announced to the group, and it generally
made known that so and so who was a square has become a
circle, because they did not receive enough points, and so
and so who was a circle, is now a square because they
received a higher number of points than a square. In any
event, it is important that the group know that the squares
are made up of those people with the highest scores.
12. Start the second round.
NOTE: Repeat this cycle—bargaining session, bonus
.;'• session, reclassification for one or two times
or until the participants understand:the process .
and the fact that the squares are high scorers.
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3.3. After al)out I.In.: Kacoirtl boni.in sewsjon, announce; that the
squares now have- the authority to make, the rules for the. game mid
that while any group can suggest rules for the game the squares
will decide which rules will he implemented. You might tell the
squares that they might .want to make rules like: re-distribute the
chips on a more equal basis, require triangles and circles to bar-
gain with the squares even though they have theii: arms folded,
require, triangles and circles to give, squares the chips they ask
for regardless of whether they want to trade or not, etc. Announce
any rules that the squares establish to all of the .participants
unless they want them kept a secret.
14. Prom then on, play it", by ear.
What is likely to happen is that tha squares will make very
tough rules that protect their own power. This has happened in
every organized group that we have played it with so far. The
circles and triangles will either give up, organize, become hostile,
or commit an act of frustration and defiance. Stop the game when
it is evident that ths squares have made rules which the others
consider unfair and fascistic. This is generally after two to four
rounds. After the game gather the group together and discuss the
implications of the game, for the real world.
Some questions you might want to discuss at the end of the game
a. Are there any parallels between the system set up by the
game .and the system or subsystem in which we live?
b. Does the game say anything about: the nature of man?
c. la it the nature of man to seek inequality? To attempt to
be better than his fellow, man, to seek for more privileges
and wealth? If yes, is there anything wrong with such
strivings. Can they be legitimized? Is there a moral
alternative to man's search for inequality?
d. Would it have made much difference if the people who were
the circles had been the squares?
e. Were the squares acting with legitimate, authority?
f. Are the re any parallels between the game and the race
problem, the campus problems, the problems faced by our
founding fathers?
g. If an entire group acts in unison such as the circles and
triangles frequently do in going against the squares, does
their actions have more legitimacy then when a person acts
alone?
h. Is; the .square a masculine or feminine symbol?
i. Would it be possible to develop a game: vUir.h emphasized
cooperative behavior aud is fuu to play?
166
Summary of Rule:s for Running Star Power
1. Prepare distribution of chips. .
2. Divide, participants into three, groups.
3. Distribute symbols to appropriate groups.
4. Distribute chips.
5. Explain rules for trading session.
6. Have the group trade for 10 miiuit.es or so.
7. After ten or so minutes stop trading session and have the
participants return to their original group.
8. Have them record scores on slips.
9. Give three bonus chips to each group.
10.- Explain rules for bonus chips to each group.
11. Give the participants five to ten minutes for bonus chip
session. ... •
12. While they are in bonus group session collect all the
. chips originally distributed and prepare them for the
second round of distribution.
13. End bonus chip session. ; '
14. Revise the scores on the board to reflect points
received from the bonus chips. :
15. Promote high scoring persons to squares and demote low
scoring squares to circles or triangles..
END OF THE FIRST ROUND
16. Repeat process. .
, 17. After second or third round ;give rights to make rules for.
the game to the squares.
18. Play it by the nose from then on.
One note of caution. Generally groups need to talk about the
game in personal terms or, "who did what to whom" before going on
to the issues involved. This can be an important experience in
interpersonal relationships, helping members of the group under-
stand their reaction to authority, competitive situations, etc.
However, it is important that this discussion does not damage the
ego, status or self-concept of any of the participiints. If you see
the discussion going beyond the point of friendly rivalry, then
you might direct it more forcibly toward the issues involved rather
than the personalities. If in the unlikely event that the squares
are being badly scapegoated, then you might point out that every
group that -has participated in the game thus far has reacted in
essentially the.same manner and in general try to direct the dis-
cussion toward the question of whether any group put in such a
situation woxild-act any differently.
 :
APPENDIX G
167
EXPERIMENT '
The tension between conflict and cooperation has long been the
subject of scholarly research. This problem transcends the usual
limits of scientific application. No matter what the state of
verifiable and reliable knowledge, decisions are made daily—in
personal and local affairs, between states and nations—which, are
known to be. based on limited knowledge of human affairs.
Game Theory is a powerful tool in the examination of conflict:
and cooperation. To date, it has been used in the laboratory with
hired subjects- (or with students, often part of a course). A
recent study which included behaviorial concepts is R. Ackoff\s •
work for the U. S. Disarmament Commission. This study used
student subjects from the University of. Pennsylvania and Drexel
University, and ends with a hueristic finding: to optimize your
payoffs, play the so-called platinum rule—do unto others as you
2
expect them to do unto you.
It is my thought that this role reversal theory is a function
of similar attitudes the subjects bring with them to the game.
An experiment was conducted, with subjects who were genuinely
hostile with one another, in a real life setting, to examine their
characteristics' of play in a simple 'game'.. Inconstancies fo\md
in experimental results from studies in Game Theory are hypothesised
to be related tCb-tue normative values brought to the analysis by the
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subject, and not representative of inadequacy in the. theory jj_er__s£..
The. experiment was conducted as part of. a behaviorial workshop, wit:h
change in play behavior characteristics measured a priori and
£ost£rjLpjr to the experience.
GAME THEORY
Game Theory is a rigorous deductive approach to the study of
conflict and cooperation in human behavior. Springing from the
monumental work of Von Neuman and Mor gen stern published at .the close.
3
of World War II, it is judged by many to stand on a par with
4
Newton's celestial mechanics as a scientific achievement.
However great the conceptual achievement, though, Game
Theory has proved less than useful as a predictive model of human
behavior. Experimental evidence yields significant paradoxical
results, which have been subject to attempts to resolve them
logically.6'7'8'9
For instance., take the often-used "Prisoner's Dilemma."
Prisonc-;r•' s Dilemna
K,R S,T
T>R>P>S
T,S
The rows of this matrix contain outcomes (in utilities) for a.
3.
strategies; columns contain outcomes for 3. strategies.
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The dilemma becomes clear with a numerical example:
31 62
3,3 0,5
5,0
Rationality (as always in Game Theory) means doing the best
for oneself; Following the now-classic Game Theoretical Approach
of Vou Neuman and Morgenstern, equilibrium and therefore solution
lies at a ',• $„. If communication and agreement between players are
possible, a;, 3-, provides a superioe (i.e., more "rational") outcome
for both players. .
However, with actual experimentation with this particular
matrix (and similar matrices) uncooperative behavior (cu, 3,,) char-
acterized subject behavior under conditions of communication and
••'•••"•' ' ' 12 ' • ' ' •
agreement ranging from zero to total.
Various modifications of theory have been devised to satisfy
this dilemma. 'However, I hypothesize that the dilemma is created
not by inadequacies of game theory, but by normative values beought
to the game by the players.
VALUE SYSTEMS
Social Scientists have long been aware of the interaction
between values and society. Weber's analysis of the connectives .
33between social, values and.capitalistic institutions" perhaps
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. initiated modern interest in tVjc-. phenomenon. ' Additional studies
have Investipaf.ocl various interrelationships:'Achievement, ".'" ''
I
1 o ig 20 '
economic development, and family patterns. * ' j
However, the literature on social and cultural change, 'although
extensive, contains little emperical attention to the. research
issues: what are the profiles of value cotripone.nl: associated with
21individual and group behavior? Furthermore, most studies are
laterally comparative due to the pragmatic considerations of the
long time constant of societal change, effect of external influences,
22
and the time frams available for study and publication.
The D. D. Workshop, based on its T-Group antecedents, has as
one of its prime resultants the shift in participant attitude "
from individual goal setting to group goal setting, from initial
hostility to trust,,from original heirarchical authority expecta-
tions to collaborative leadership. The group "culture" at the
termination of the experience as compared with the start contains
operational normative values of trust, openness, and joint
responsibility for resolving conflicts. An experiment: is designed
longitudinally with a "Prisoner's Dilemma" the measure player
prior and posterior to a-workshop with T-Group naive, subjects.
MEASUREMENT SELECTED
A Prisoner's Dilemma-type matrix game, known as "Chicken"
i
was selected. Cell values as shown:
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+5,4-5
10.-1
-1,4-10
0,0
Note the minivaax solutions:
For a
10
-1
MAXIM IN
For
-1
-1
10
0
0 KIN
MAXIM IH
Thus, we 'find equilibrium at .(o^,) + °>°-
If either player deviates, and his opponent does not, the
opponent receives 4-.10, while the player who deviated receives. -1.
If both players deviate, each receives H-5. : :
Playing the (a, 3.) strategy requires communication and trust
between the players.
If trust. ,' communications and goal setting .which involve the
^ 8anie- playoff is followed:
i.e. I/(a Payoff 10
We can expect cug-, in experimental play.
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Note -that: £(0^  -I- 0?) •= >:.(u'2 H- f^) = 9
and E
If goal setting is versus opponent, then v;e find' conununi.cat.ion
and pattern of play which results in mixed behavior, designed to
obtain -MO for oneself.
PLAY OF THE GAME
Play was pr'e- and post-workshop. A control group was
solicited from friends of the players not attending the workshop.
When the game was played, np_ instructions were given to direct
attention toward either conflict or cooperation.
Communications .between players (but not among), was allowed to
permit reaching d.31 agreement.
DATA
The game was played pre- arid post-workshop. Data are
summarized by player's patterns of behavior:
PRIOR TO WORKSHOP
POST .'WORKSHOP
COOPERATIVE
PLAY
27%
92%
CONFLICT
PLAY
73%
8%
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DATA ANALYSIS •
The present study has not provided statistical valid data, as
experimental data did not include provisions for learning processes,
subject matching, and longitudinal and lateral control groups.
The data indicates, however, a phenomenon which needs
rigorous investigation.
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